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Articles
PUBLIC EDUCATION AS PUBLIC SPACE: SOME REFLECTIONS
ON THE UNFINISHED WORK OF MARC FELDMAN
RICHARD C. BOLDT*
"STRANGER, if you passing meet me and desire to speak to
me,
why should you not speak to me?
And why should I not speak to you?"1
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1996, my friend and colleague, Marc Feldman,
wrote to several dozen leading education theorists and reformers
around the country. At the time, Marc was planning a sabbatical from
his faculty position at the University of Maryland School of Law for the
following year. The letters were intended to solicit help from Marc's
carefully selected correspondents in locating "very good urban public
school [s]" where he might spend the next academic year.2 Each letter
acknowledged that his was "a somewhat unusual request,"' given that
Marc-a lawyer and law professor-was not particularly interested in
serving in a narrow legal capacity. As he put it:
The motivation ... for my sabbatical is an interest in educa-
tion. While I am willing to assume legal responsibilities as
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. A.B., Columbia College;
J.D., Yale Law School. An unusually generous group of readers provided comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. For all their help, I wish to thank Eileen Canfield, Dan Fried-
man, Deborah Hellman, Alan Hornstein, Peter Quint, Jana Singer, and Gordon Young. In
addition, I received many useful suggestions from the participants at a Faculty Workshop
held at the University of Maryland School of Law in October 2001. Not surprisingly, given
the nature of this project, many of these readers expressed at least some level of disagree-
ment with either the shape of my argument, my conclusions, or both. I have sought to
adjust the paper to take account of as many of these comments as I could, and I am confi-
dent that it is a better work as a consequence. Of course, I alone am responsible for defi-
ciencies in the final product.
1. Walt Whitman, To You, in LEAvEs OF GRAss 10 (Bantam Classic ed., Bantam Books
1983) (1892).
2. See, e.g., Letter from Marc Feldman, Professor of Law, University of Maryland
School of Law, to Deborah Meier, President, Center for Collaborative Education 1 (Feb. 8,
1996) (on file with author).
3. Id.
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part of a "sabbatical bargain," I hope to limit my role as law-
yer. I fully realize that my lack of specific expertise and skill
adds to the difficulty of my request. The best I can offer is an
abiding interest, a willingness to make a serious commit-
ment, and two decades of at least generally relevant exper-
iences .... I think/hope I would have something to offer a
school in exchange for its rather considerable contribution
to me.4
Marc's letters were characteristically detailed and deliberate. He
explained that he was "most interested in understanding the possibili-
ties of systematic reform-the reform of school systems or districts,
not just single classrooms or schools."5 He also made clear that he
wished to be involved with public school teachers, administrators, and
students as an active participant, not simply as an observer or visitor.6
He wrote:
I can imagine spending time in classrooms working directly
with students and teachers. Alternatively, I can imagine
shadowing and assisting a very capable principal of such a
school. If there were a school administrator or foundation
officer with a highly developed educational vision and suffi-
cient clout to implement that vision in more than an incre-
mental way, assisting him or her would also be a possibility.7
In the end, however, Marc allowed that he was "open-minded"
about "other settings and situations, not immediately apparent ... )
that would be well worth considering."' The one requirement about
which he said he was "inflexible" was that, by the end of his sabbatical,
4. Letter from Marc Feldman, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of
Law, to Lee Frissell, Director of Field Projects, New York University 2 (Mar. 12, 1996) (on
file with author).
5. Id at 1.
6. Id. In this regard, Marc was sensitive to the concern raised by one educator that
"those who study schools (be they from universities, think tanks, or school bureaucracies)
prefer to keep their distance from the schools they study." Ann Cook, Whose Story Gets
Told? Rethinking Research on Schools, EDUC. WK., Jan. 19, 1994, at 48. He recognized that
teachers and education researchers often have conflicting agendas. "Practitioners ... are
consumed by the day-to-dayness of school: of finding ways to meet the challenges from
one's students, the needs of one's colleagues, the demands of one's supervisors. Research-
ers are out to prove a point, validate their point of view, formulate a theory, emphasize the
esoteric." Id. As a consequence, Marc quite consciously sought "a new research model
based on inquiry-based collaboration in which researchers and school communities to-
gether explore issues of mutual interest and acknowledged value." Id. at 35.
7. Letter from Marc Feldman to Deborah Meier, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Id. at 2.
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it was essential that he have had "a deep and comprehensive look at
efforts to create effective schools."9
The notion that a law professor might wish to devote his research
leave to learning about public schools does not seem like a very great
stretch, given legal issues current within the field of education. Law-
yers and legal academics rightly continue to worry over the resegrega-
tion of public schools,1" efforts to establish school voucher programs
and other "parent choice" initiatives designed to move public educa-
tion dollars to private (sometimes religious) schools,'1 and the dimin-
ishing ability of some local communities-particularly African
American and Latino communities-to play a meaningful role in mat-
ters of school governance.' 2 Indeed, each of these areas was of in-
tense interest to Marc.
More fundamentally, though, his choice to spend a year actively
involved in the daily workings of several public schools was part of a
larger undertaking, in which he was seeking to explore the political
potential of public institutions of many sorts. Marc, along with several
other recent commentators, had begun to focus his work on the polit-
ics of "public space."' 3 In this respect, his concern over the vitality of
public schools was related directly to his interest in a wide variety of
public institutions, including the design, regulation and use of munic-
9. Letter from Marc Feldman to Lee Frissell, supra note 4, at 1.
10. See, e.g., DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW
(1995) (exploring the causes, development, and solutions to the school desegregation
problem through consideration of judicial, social science, educational, and ideological
viewpoints) ;john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, 80 MINN. L.
REv. 749 (1996) (discussing the problem of racial segregation in public schools and argu-
ing that desegregation is necessary to build a true democracy).
11. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHJBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERiCA'S
SCHOOLS (1990) (contending that the education problem in America can be attributed to
political institutions that foster excessive bureaucracy, and arguing in favor of a new system
of public education that would rely on markets and parental choice); James S. Liebman,
Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE LJ. 259 (1991) (reviewing CHUBB & MOE, supra) (criticizing
Chubb and Moe's interpretation of their data and the reasoning behind their arguments,
and offering a proposal for greater parental participation in public schools).
12. See James Dao, Albany in Schools Accord to Give Chancellor Power and Weaken Local
Boards, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1996, at Al (discussing the New York State legislature's deci-
sion to centralize hiring authority for New York City public schools in the school's
chancellor).
13. See, e.g., Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1047 (1996) (criti-
cizing the current "urban policy" of the government for nurturing suburban autonomy
while simultaneously isolating the poor and racial minorities, and suggesting a new urban
policy designed to promote "community building"); see also John 0. Calmore, A Call To
Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and
Poverty, 67 FoRDHAI L. REV. 1927 (1999) (examining "cause lawyering" on behalf of the
inner-city poor, specifically in light of the "spatial and geographic marginalization that
deepens their .. .racist and economic subordination").
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ipal parks, and questions of city planning and urban land use policy
more generally. t4 In Marc's conception, the public institutions impli-
cated in these areas, together with labor and professional associations,
the mass media, and other civic organizations, play a key role in help-
ing to shape individual identities and larger societal norms. His con-
viction was that particular questions related to the operation of these
institutions, including many that are framed as legal questions, bear
directly upon their ability to support progressive political outcomes.1 5
This conviction, in turn, was of central importance to Marc, whose
professional life was devoted to progressive social change.
In his last major article, Political Lessons: Legal Services For The
Poor,6 Marc took up a different but related topic. As part of his explo-
ration of the history and current functioning of legal services pro-
grams around the country, Marc identified some of the features of
contemporary Western culture that he believed undermine the ability
of advocates for the poor to wage effective legal advocacy.17 While he
painted with a broad brush, several of his claims provide insight into
his thinking about public institutions, public space, and civic life. i"
Marc's key assertion was that an ongoing "privatization of social life"
has fundamentally changed "social meaning" within American soci-
ety. l" Relatedly, he claimed that a growing "radical individualism"2 °
has "sedated us from the realities of power ...."21 Marc linked the
14. This claim, and much of my description of Marc's thinking in the pages that follow,
is based upon extensive conversations we had before, during, and after his sabbatical year.
15. Robin West's definition of "progressive constitutionalism" comes very close to cap-
turing the sort of progressive politics referred to in this text. While West's attention is on
constitutionalism, her more general notion is that individual citizens should be entitled
not only to governmental protection against danger but also to the "'positive liberties' of
civic participation, meaningful work, and unthreatened intimacy." ROBIN WEST, PROGRES-
SIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2-3 (1994).
16. Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor, 83 GEO. L.J. 1529 (1995).
17. Id. at 1599-1621.
18. Marc's immediate concern in his Legal Services article was with the ways in which
these features of contemporary culture lead legal services lawyers to play a "remissive" role
in "sublimating conflict and politics." Id. at 1618. Notwithstanding the specificity of his
analysis in this regard, it is clear that this cultural critique was part of a much larger project.
19. Id. at 1599.
20. As Marc explained:
We have become radical individualists. We behave as if there are no limits to the
attention we should pay, the importance we should accord, or the fulfillment we
can achieve for ourselves. We characterize and criticize the larger world as imper-
sonal, alienating, and unfeeling. In contrast, our emotions are immediate and
engaging.
Id. at 1599 n.202.
21. Id. at 1611. In addition, Marc argued that power itself, in the form of state author-
ity, has been reconfigured in recent years, so that it no longer resides exclusively in govern-
mental institutions. He claimed that much state power has been privatized or transferred
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growth of radical individualism to mainstream liberal theory more
generally, which he believed "contributes to the dissolution of social
ties and relationships and, simultaneously, the promotion of social
conformity."22
Marc's account of this privatization of social life is worth quoting
at length.
As there has been a privatization of state power, so too
there has been a privatization of social life, although with
very different meaning as to the accumulation and exercise
of power. We have constructed and pursued individual lives
that are increasingly psychomorphic. We seek psychic ab-
sorption, not social participation; we find social meaning in
individual human feelings, not in collective civil activity.
Our psychic absorption is pervasive, and we are ill-served
by such a commitment. Intimate society is ruled by personal-
ity; social meaning is accorded by reference to feeling....
Even explanations about one's place in the world have
yielded to understanding via personality and feeling. We
have abandoned class as a meaningful construct, despite sys-
tematic inequalities of wealth and power. Rather, with En-
lightenment sensibilities, we proclaim that each of us has
equal potential and equal opportunity. In this way, what we
accomplish (or fail to accomplish) and the inequalities some
of us experience are the result of personal effort and ambi-
tion. Not class nor race nor gender, but individual charac-
ter. Dignity for those who succeed, guilt for those who do
not, and social isolation for all.23
This social isolation concerned Marc not only because he be-
lieved it diminishes the accomplishments of which each of us is capa-
ble, but also because he believed it diminishes-indeed, makes
impossible-democratic civil society. His position was that "a vision of
life that values the private over the public, the personal over the so-
cial, and the affective more than the cognitive" is importantly to
to "nominally private entities," and that this shift has yielded centers of authority in which
power is "more concentrated," "more remote," and "less publicly accountable." Id. at 1599.
He further asserted that " [ t]he privatization of state power has decentralized state power."
Id. at 1599 n.201. Marc quoted Sheldon Wolin on this point: " ' What in fact occurs through
privatization is not the elimination of power but the elimination of politics, that is, the
public discussion and argument over how power is to be used, for what ends, and who is
responsible.'" Id. (quoting SHELDON S. WOLIN, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST: ESSAYS ON THE
STATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 182 (1989)).
22. Feldman, supra note 16, at 1600 n.203.
23. Id. at 1599-1600 (footnotes omitted).
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blame for the absence of a progressive politics.24 Such a retreat from
public life, and the corresponding abandonment of public discourse,
facilitates the marginalization of low income groups and communities
of color, and prevents the formation of effective social movements.25
Thus, for Marc, a practice designed to foster the development of pub-
lic institutions, including public schools, and to strengthen their ca-
pacity to support civic life was itself an affirmative political project.
This project, in turn, was informed by the pragmatist philosophy
of John Dewey.26 On one hand, Marc's choice to immerse himself in
pragmatist theory while pursuing a practice focused on public educa-
tion makes perfect sense, given that Dewey's work has dominated
American education theory for most of the past century.27 On the
other hand, Marc was generally attracted to pragmatism as a philoso-
phy, and to a pragmatist methodology that embeds theory within con-
crete practice.2 a He was also taken with the antiformalism of the legal
24. Id. at 1601-02.
25. See id. at 1599-1602. In addition, Marc believed that a restructuring of social, politi-
cal, and economic power is impossible without the mediating influence of conflict. In his
account, the very same cultural features that disrupt the development of collective con-
sciousness-the retreat from public life and abandonment of public discourse-also are
the source of what he regarded as a disabling contemporary abhorrence of conflict. Id. at
1603 n.212.
26. In a memo seeking a summer research grant to begin work on an article that subse-
quently would become his sabbatical project, Marc had the following to say about public
education and John Dewey:
There is hardly a more pressing contemporary issue than that of public edu-
cation. While questions of funding, academic organization, and performance
measures abound, the real questions we must confront are those relating to edu-
cational excellence and equality of achievement. These were familiar concerns to
[John] Dewey and [Robert Maynard] Hutchins.... [P]regnant within the educa-
tional discussion are ideas and struggles about our conceptions of community,
politics, and personality. In my article about Legal Services, I made an initial
foray into these subjects. With this article, I continue my consideration ....
To my mind, John Dewey is best characterized as a "minority, not a majority,
spokesman ... whose democratic vision failed to find an important place in lib-
eral ideology .... He was a "more radical voice" for "participatory democracy."
He believed in a notion of individual development through political, social, and
cultural participation. He rejected a narrower notion of democracy as an "ex post
facto check on the power of elites" in favor of something more positive and sub-
stantive, At its most general, Dewey's thought revealed the tension between liber-
alism and democracy. ... [T]his is the topic I continue to explore in this article.
Memo from Marc Feldman, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, to
Donald Gifford, Dean, University of Maryland School of Law 8-9 (Mar. 17, 1994) (quoting
ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at xiv-xv (1991)) (on file
with author).
27. See RIcHARD J. BERNSTEIN, JOHN DEWEY 1 (1966) ("John Dewey is known as
America's most influential philosopher and educator.").
28. Marc's commitment to pursuing theoretical work within the context of concrete
practice is well illustrated by his unusual decision to obtain his basic legal training by read-
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realists who owed much to Dewey, William James, Charles Sanders
Peirce, and the other pragmatists. 9
Marc knew that his decision to adopt a pragmatist theoretical per-
spective carried considerable intellectual baggage. Indeed, pragma-
tism is hedged in by a combination of both longstanding and
contemporary criticisms that are relevant to Marc's particular project.
The long-standing critique was offered most forcefully by Robert May-
nard Hutchins in the 1930s.30 The more contemporary concerns have
been set out with particular clarity by David Luban.3" Marc believed
that these two related critiques constituted genuine challenges to his
desire to employ pragmatist thinking within the context of his pro-
gressive politics. Much of this Article is directed toward thinking
through that problem.
Marc appreciated the power of Hutchins's critique of Dewey, and
of the parallel critique of legal realism offered by its critics in the
1930s and beyond. 2 Marc was sensitive to the charge that pragmatism
as a political philosophy and legal realism as a jurisprudence, because
of their foundations in empiricism, could be understood as entirely
positivist, utilitarian systems of thought.33 Marc's concern, and the
concern of others who have looked at this problem, was that these
theories could lead to a kind of pure instrumentalism, inconsistent
ing law in a law office instead of attending law school. His subsequent efforts designing
and implementing the Legal Theory and Practice curriculum at the University of Maryland
School of Law provide further evidence of his career-long attachment to this way of work-
ing. For a fuller discussion of Marc's understanding of the proper relationship between
legal theory and practice, see Richard C. Boldt & Marc Feldman, The Faces of Law In Theory
and Practice: Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Context, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1111 (1992).
29. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, The Pragmatic Method, in ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY 123 (1978);
Charles Sanders Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in PRAGMATISM 26 (Louis Menand ed.,
1997). On the rise of legal realism and the role played by pragmatism in its development,
see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-94 (1973).
30. Robert M. Hutchins, Grammar, Rhetoric, and Mr. Dewey, Soc. FRONTIER, Feb. 1937, at
137 [hereinafter Hutchins, Grammar].
31. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 125-78 (1994).
32. For a representative listing of the group of scholars who comprised the initial legal
realist movement, see Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARv. L. REV. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931). For a good example of the criticism leveled
against the realists, see MortimerJ. Adler, Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1931)
(reviewing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930)); Morris R. Cohen, Justice
Holmes and the Nature of Law, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 353 (1931).
33. See, e.g., BAILEY KUKLIN &JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN INTER-
DISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 61 (1994).
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with the normative or political commitments that were essential to his
project.3 4
In addition, Marc was mindful of a related set of limitations that
some have attributed to the pragmatist alternative. Luban, in particu-
lar, has argued that pragmatism-or more precisely neopragmatism-
is not well suited to an activist politics aimed at fundamentally restruc-
turing society because its reliance on contextual analysis is inherently
protective of the status quo." Suzanna Sherry has made a similar
point in arguing that a central characteristic of legal pragmatism is its
incrementalism. 36 "Instead of abstract, unitary, foundational princi-
ples, legal pragmatists rely on a web of 'coherence with existing beliefs
as the basis for decisions [and] those beliefs limit the possibility of
radical improvement.' ,37
Marc knew as well that a parallel assessment of the limited poten-
tial of postmodern political/legal theory to support a progressive po-
litical practice also has been put forward in recent years. In this
account, offered most particularly by Joel Handler, many of the fea-
tures that postmodern theory shares with pragmatism, including its
antiessentialism, antifoundationalism, and conventionalism,3" are
identified as precisely the basis for its inability to animate a radical
politics.3" In fact, Marc was concerned that an unreconstructed
postmodernism that permits no "grand narrative" might be incapable
of generating the sort of class and race-conscious politics to which he
was committed. The question he wished to address through his sab-
batical work was whether the insights of Dewey and his intellectual
34. Marc's practice as a poverty lawyer and his commitment to work in collaboration
with disempowered communities is described in his scholarship. See Boldt & Feldman,
supra note 28.
35. See LUBAN, supra note 31, at 126-27 ("[P]ragmatism-notwithstanding its seeming
radicalism-requires us to treat our concepts conservatively.").
36. See Suzanna Sherry, Progressive Regression, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1097 (1995) (reviewing
ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT (1994)).
37. Id. at 1111 (quoting Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor the
Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 163, 170).
38. For a thorough discussion of these characteristics, see LUBAN, supra note 31, at 133-
41. See also infra text accompanying notes 220-249. In a telling footnote in his 1992 article
on postmodern theory in the Law & Society Review, Michael W. McCann observes that he
"often confound[s] graduate students by challenging them to distinguish post-modernism
from the pluralism of 1950s social science, or Dewey's older liberal pragmatism. Differ-
ences exist, but the similarities are also striking." Michael W. McCann, Resistance, Recon-
struction, and Romance in Legal Scholarship, 26 LAw & Soc'v REV. 733, 736 n.5 (1992).
39. SeeJoel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 697 (1992).
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heirs with respect to the inter-subjective nature of identity4 ° and the
constitutive power of civic life4' could be made coherent with a pro-
gressive political practice.
In the early part of the twentieth century, some "objectivist" or
"naturalist" social scientists and philosophers allied with Dewey had
indeed asserted that because "value systems could only be the prod-
ucts of social, economic, and psychological pressures operating on in-
dividuals and groups . .. no values could be called 'higher' in any
meaningful sense. Some obviously had greater social support, but
none had any greater 'validity."' 42 In Marc's view Dewey had rejected
this conclusion, and had attempted to develop a "convincing natural-
istic method of value criticism and justification."4 He believed that
Dewey should be understood as a radical democratic theorist. 44 He
regretted that Dewey has come to be read as a mainstream liberal le-
gal and political thinker, and he wished to reclaim Dewey's pragmatist
legacy, which he feared has been limited by a too constrained reading
of his work on the cultural grounding of ethics.
45
In order to accomplish this work, Marc understood that he would
have to follow Dewey's injunction to collapse the dichotomy between
40. See john a. powell, The Multiple Self" Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and
Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1997) (suggesting that the "self" is fragmented, and
that the idea of the "multiple self" has significant legal implications).
41. See Frug, supra note 13, at 1075-81 (describing the important role cities play in
community building).
42. PURCELL, supra note 29, at 42.
43. Id. Further,
Dewey seized on the idea of culture as a way around the theoretical problem.
Whatever one thought about the foundations of morality, he reasoned, strong
individual and communal values in fact existed. Modern anthropology demon-
strated that such values arose out of a general cultural matrix which characterized
every society. The crucial practical problem confronting democracy, then, was
the discovery of what kind of culture produced democratic institutions.
Id. at 211.
44. See Memo from Marc Feldman to Donald Gifford, Mar. 17, 1994, supra note 26, at 9
(stating "[t]o my mind, John Dewey... was a ... radical voice for participatory democ-
racy"). Robert Westbrook takes the same position in his intellectual history ofJohn Dewey.
WESTBROOK, supra note 26.
45. In the early 1990s, a diverse group of academics seized upon pragmatism as a
source of authority, or at least inspiration. See Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in
American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569 (1990) (including articles and comments
from such luminaries of the legal academy as Martha Minow, Richard Posner, Margaret
Radin, Frank Michelman, and Mari Matsuda, as well as other allied scholars such as Cornel
West, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnum). The readings of Dewey and his intellectual
legacy presented in the symposium are as disparate in content as their authors are diverse
in political and philosophical orientation. Notwithstanding these various depictions, Marc
believed that Dewey's work is best characterized as setting out a radical democratic political
and moral philosophy.
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theory and practice.46 Marc thus sought out examples of vibrant ur-
ban public schools, making clear that he wished to enter their milieu
not as an observer but as a full participant in their collective en-
deavor. 47 In essence, his decision to "practice" in these public institu-
tions, to move within the public space demarcated by their activities,
was motivated by a hope that his daily interactions with students,
teachers, parents, local school board members, and others would pro-
vide him with the basis for effecting a reconciliation of his pragmatist
thinking and his political commitments.
Although I have described the Hutchins and Luban/Handler cri-
tiques of pragmatism as "intellectual baggage," the challenges
presented by these critiques stood potentially as practical barriers to
Marc's work as well. Both pragmatist theory and a radical vision of
society deeply resonated for him, and, I believe, the complex relation-
ship between pragmatism and radical democratic politics created a
motivating tension that informed his research. In the remainder of
this Article, I seek to work out a response to each of the two critiques
that Marc perceived as impinging upon his project.48 The first section
takes up the Dewey-Hutchins debate, as a means of framing the argu-
ment that Deweyan pragmatism is devoid of any necessary substantive
political/normative commitments. I conclude in this section that
46. An essential feature of Dewey's work was its rejection of the theory-practice distinc-
tion, as well as many other dichotomies familiar in Western thought. See Abraham Kaplan,
Introduction to 10 JOHN DEwEY, THE LATER WORKS: 1925-1953, at xii (Jo Ann Boydston ed.,
1989).
47. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
48. Several colleagues who provided comments on earlier drafts of this Article sug-
gested either that the piece did not provide sufficient description of Marc Feldman's life
and work, or that the discussion failed to signal adequately when it was speaking in Marc's
voice and when in mine. Given these entirely reasonable complaints, I wish to make clear
that the fundamental questions I address in this Article were framed entirely by Marc, both
in his published and unpublished work. The effort to think through these questions, on
the other hand, is largely my own understanding. Indeed, my conversations with Marc
about his research and my review of his notes and papers make me confident that Marc
had not yet come to firm conclusions regarding these matters when he was forced to sus-
pend work on account of illness. I have been guided in my efforts to work out an analysis
of these issues by a wealth of material that Marc had gathered in advance of and during his
sabbatical. A great majority of the citations in this Article, including most of the footnote
references to theoretical material, newspaper accounts, essays on education, and the like,
were contained in "banker's boxes" that Marc employed as a sort of working library. At
best, my own conclusions regarding the Dewey-Hutchins debate and the Luban/Handler
critique of neo-pragmatism should be read as tentative. My attempts to apply Deweyan
theory to several contemporary education issues in which Marc was involved represent per-
haps the closest this Article comes to co-authorship. For those readers who wish to learn
more about Marc's life and work, I recommend the memorial essays that were published in
the Maryland Law Review shortly after his death. See In Memoriam: Marc Feldman, 58 MD. L.
REv. 325 (1999).
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Dewey's brand of pragmatist philosophy and education theory can be
read to contain a particular political ethics that is consistent with
Marc's aspirations, notwithstanding its general rejection of a priori
reasoning. In the second section, I consider the related argument
that pragmatism (and its first cousin, postmodernism) are inherently
conservative theoretical perspectives. Here again, albeit in a some-
what tentative fashion, I conclude that Marc's brand of progressive
democracy can be undertaken without jettisoning his theoretical at-
tachment to Dewey and his postmodern fellow travelers. I thus end
up endorsing the position of Allan Hutchinson that there "is no neces-
sary contradiction between a continuing loyalty to a [pragmatist or]
postmodern perspective and the practical implementation of a radical
political agenda."4 In the third and final section of this Article, I
draw upon the work of several legal scholars who have written about
the importance of urban public space, including public schools.50
When read together with Marc's notes and the other materials he
compiled, this work begins to suggest a perspective on current issues
within the field of public education that honors both Marc's pragma-
tism and his commitment to a progressive democratic politics.
Sadly, Marc died before he was able to put into writing the lessons
he took from this set of experiences. As a consequence, this Article
does not provide complete answers to the questions that led Marc to
the Manhattan Village Academy, the Central Park East Secondary
School, and the Julia Richman Education Complex-the central-city
public schools where he taught and studied. It does, however, suggest
the direction in which his thinking was headed, and it begins to
demonstrate the potential he hoped to discover in these public
spaces.
I. PRAGMATIC ETHICS
In late 1936, Robert Maynard Hutchins, early in his tenure as
president of the University of Chicago and formerly the dean of the
Yale Law School, published The Higher Learning in America.51 John
Dewey, pragmatist and progressive, then at Columbia University, re-
sponded critically to Hutchins's educational ideas and rationalist met-
aphysics. In a series of articles and talks by both participants and
49. Allan C. Hutchinson, Doing The Right Thing? Toward a Postmodern Politics, 26 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 773, 774 (1992).
50. See generally Frug, supra note 13; powell, supra note 10, at 749.
51. ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA (1936) [hereinafter THE
HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA].
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various supporters, the debate was joined.52 As compared to Dewey's
intellectual combat with Walter Lippmann and Reinhold Niebuhr,53
this exchange has not been extensively examined.54
On one level, the Dewey-Hutchins exchange was a debate about
the form and content of education-specifically higher education, but
also education in society more generally. Both Dewey and Hutchins
were educational theorists and both played a part in building alterna-
tive educational institutions, most prominently Dewey's leadership in
developing the Chicago Lab School and Hutchins's pivotal role in the
founding of St. John's College."
But the debate had significance beyond educational theory. It
was also an important event in the emergence of legal realism.56 In
fact, this early dialogue signaled intellectual cross-currents that have
swirled within the legal academy for over five decades.5 The debate,
which took place against the backdrop of the rise of political authori-
tarianism in Europe, was fundamentally about the nature and justifica-
tion of democratic society.58 Within that tumultuous context, the
positions staked out by Dewey and Hutchins served to define educa-
tional and philosophical battle lines that continue to shape public dis-
course and the development of public policy today. 9
52. Hutchins first addressed Dewey explicitly in a speech he delivered in early 1934.
ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, No FRIENDLY VOICE 33-40 (1936) [hereinafter No FRIENDLY VOICE].
Dewey took up the debate by publishing two reviews of The Higher Learning. John Dewey,
President Hutchins' Proposals to Remake Higher Education, Soc. FRONTIER, Jan. 1937, at 103
[hereinafter Dewey, Proposals to Remake Higher Education]; John Dewey, Rationality in Educa-
tion, Soc. FRONTIER, Dec. 1936, at 71 [hereinafter Dewey, Rationality]. Hutchins's response
came almost immediately. Hutchins, Grammar, supra note 30. Dewey then provided a re-
joinder the next month. John Dewey, The Higher Learning in America, Soc. FRONTIER, Mar.
1937, at 167 [hereinafter Dewey, The Higher Learning in America]. Others who continued
the debate included Mortimer Adler and Sidney Hook. See MortimerJ. Adler, The Crisis in
Contemporary Education, Soc. FRONTIER, Feb. 1939, at 140; Sidney Hook, Metaphysics and
Social Attitudes: A Reply, Soc. FRONTIER, Feb. 1938, at 153.
53. See PURCELL, supra note 29, at 152-56.
54. But see William P. Martin, The Dewey-Hutchins Debate On General Education,
1929 to 1945: A Case of Progressive Historical Bias (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Temple University) (on file with the Temple University Library); Rene Vincente Arcilla,
Metaphysics in Education after Hutchins and Dewey, 93 TCHRS. C. REC. 281 (1991).
55. See Martin, supra note 54, at 71, 119.
56. See PURCELL, supra note 29, at 74-94 (describing the rise of legal realism); RICHARD
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 387 (1995) ("In a nutshell: The pragmatic movement gave
legal realism such intellectual shape and content as it had.").
57. See PURCELL, supra note 29, at 74-94.
58. Memo from Marc Feldman to Donald Gifford, Mar. 17, 1994, supra note 26, at 7.
59. This debate between proponents of the pragmatic naturalism of Dewey and the
rationalist idealism of Hutchins centered upon the nature of truth and the role of educa-
tion in a democratic society. See Arcilla, supra note 54, at 282 (examining the divergent
viewpoints of Hutchins and Dewey on the role of metaphysics in education). Dewey sought
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A. The Dewey-Hutchins Exchange
When John Dewey assumed the chair of the philosophy depart-
ment at the then recently founded University of Chicago in 1894, he
moved quickly to gather together the principal players who would
soon become a new school of American philosophy. In rapid succes-
sion, he secured faculty appointments for George Herbert Mead,
James Rowland Angell, A.W. Moore, and Edward Scribner Ames. Col-
lectively, these pragmatist thinkers and others who joined them over
time became known as the Chicago School of American philosophy.6 °
Several key features distinguished the pragmatist philosophy of
Dewey and his colleagues. The first was an abiding intellectual com-
mitment to Charles Darwin's evolutionary naturalism. Dewey and his
followers regarded humans as part of a larger natural environment
that included all of the other animals, and that was characterized by a
to define truth in relativistic and inductive terms, starting with empirical particulars as the
foundation for constructing abstract categories of meaning, while Hutchins argued for a
deductive approach founded upon a priori commitments rooted in an explicit metaphys-
ics. See infra Part I.A. These competing positions, in turn, framed a spirited political de-
bate between the two camps, with Dewey and his supporters asserting that Hutchins's
philosophical and educational approach would lead inevitably to authoritarian outcomes,
while Hutchins and his colleagues charged that Dewey's relativism and empiricism were
likely to produce totalitarian political consequences. See Martin, supra note 54, at 169-203.
This grand struggle has been taken up in recent years by Richard Rorty and other so
called "neopragmatists" on one side, see, e.g., Richard Rorty, That Old Time Philosophy, NEW
REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1988, at 28, and the intellectual heirs of Hutchins, including Allan
Bloom and Jacques Barzun, on the other. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND (1987); JACQUES BARZUN, BEGIN HERE: THE FORGOTTEN CONDITIONS OF
TEACHING AND LEARNING (Morris H. Philipson ed., 1991). Followers of Dewey have also
appeared within the legal academy, although it is probably an overstatement to claim that
most legal scholars identified with the neopragmatist movement systematically employ a
pragmatist methodology throughout their work. See The Renaissance of Pragmatism in Ameri-
can Legal Thought, supra note 45. Notwithstanding this renewed interest in Dewey, see, e.g.,
CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EvASION OF PHILOSOPHY (1989); WESTBROOK, supra note 26,
and the somewhat less intensive discussion of Hutchins's writing, few contemporary legal
scholars have placed the Dewey-Hutchins debate at the center of their own work. One
notable exception was Marc Feldman, who believed that the questions framed by Dewey
and Hutchins, and the answers each provided, continue to exert a powerful influence on
the fundamental shape of discourse within moral and political philosophy and law. See
Memo from Marc Feldman to Donald Gifford, Mar. 17, 1994, supra note 26, at 7.
60. See Martin, supra note 54, at 49-51. At the time, William James wrote:
Chicago has a School of Thought!-a school of thought which, it is safe to pre-
dict, will figure in literature as the School of Chicago for twenty-five years to
come.... ProfessorJohn Dewey, and at least ten of his disciples, have collectively
put into the world a statement, homogeneous in spite of so many cooperating
minds, of a view of the world, both theoretical and practical, which is so simple,
massive, and positive that, in spite of the fact that many parts of it still need to be
worked out, it deserves the tide of a new system of philosophy.
WILLIAM JAMES, WRITINGS 1902-1910, at 1136 (Bruce Kuklick ed., 1987).
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
continuous process of evolution. In this respect, they believed that all
human activity, including cognition, had to be understood in dynamic
terms. Human psychology, in this account, was always changing, con-
standy adjusting to the forces of an environment that itself was the site
of flux and change.6 1
Dewey's belief in this scientific naturalism had two corollaries.
Given his conception of men and women as permanently in a state of
development and adjustment to the larger environment, Dewey also
held that human nature was essentially "plastic" and amenable to pro-
ductive change through education.62 Further, he and his colleagues
argued that humans were intrinsically social, so that the evolutionary
process of human development they described necessarily involved
communication and other forms of collective activity. 63
This evolutionary naturalism, in turn, drove adherents of the Chi-
cago School to adopt a distinctive methodology. Dewey, in particular,
was deeply attracted to monist thought.64 His methodological mo-
nism was opposed to a whole host of pairings familiar to traditional
Western thought, including practice versus theory, subjectivity versus
the objective depiction of fact, utility versus aestheticism, and means
versus ends.65
In the pragmatist philosophy, the tendency to collapse these vari-
ous dualisms was linked to their adoption of a relativistic definition of
truth and an equally relativistic conception of morality. With respect
to the former, they held that the truth of a proposition was deter-
mined not by its correspondence to objective reality, but according to
its ability to solve problems.66 With respect to the latter, the
pragmatists argued against any notion of an essential and static natu-
ral law, of a higher order of right and wrong against which all human
behavior should be judged. Instead of employing a priori ethical prin-
61. See Martin, supra note 54, at 51-53.
62. Id. at 52.
63. Id.
64. For example, Dewey believed that the division of "experience into two realms, a
higher one of changeless values and a lower one of everyday experience," led philosophy
to "a vain search for ultimate and permanent principles." Id. at 56.
65. Id. at 51. "Over and over he formulates his problem as being posed by a dualism;
he deals with the problem by showing that the duality can be reduced to something uni-
tary." Kaplan, supra note 46, at xii.
66. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 130. As one commentator has stated:
Dewey came to consider an idea not as a picture of reality, but as a plan of action,
which may turn out to be either true or false depending upon the success of the
plan. Accordingly, Dewey considered truth to be a relative condition because the
consequences of a given action were subject to change.
Martin, supra note 54, at 54.
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ciples or precepts to evaluate human behavior, they urged ethical eval-
uation based upon experience and utility.6 7
Taken together, these philosophical premises played an impor-
tant part in shaping Dewey's understanding of democracy. Counter-
posed against a traditional liberal view of democracy as conferring
upon discrete individuals a core set of negative rights to be free from
untoward interference by the state and other social collectivities,
Dewey defined democracy in affirmative terms as that set of societal
processes by which individuals are empowered to construct meaning-
ful lives.6" In this affirmative sense, Dewey understood democracy as
"a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated
experience."69
His conception of democracy was at once profoundly procedural
and deeply experiential. Dewey was committed to the "egalitarian dis-
tribution of knowledge," and the values of "free inquiry, free discus-
sion, and free expression."70 The goal of free inquiry and discussion
was not the negotiation of private concerns held by autonomous indi-
vidual actors, but rather a collective search for common understand-
ings and common solutions to societal problems. In Thomas Grey's
words: "Above all, the object of faith [in democratic practice] was 'in-
telligence,' conceived not in individual or narrowly cognitive terms,
but as the passionate, yet critical, cooperative quest for a common
human life that maximized human potential."7 1
This democratic politics was fundamentally experiential because
it described democratic practice in terms of a community of people
working together scientifically; that is, adjusting through a collective
evolutionary process to an ever-changing context, an environment in
flux. 72 In this way, Dewey's democracy assumed "the primary place of
67. Martin, supra note 54, at 54 (citing 6 JOHN DEWEY, The Problem of Truth, in THE
MIDDLE WORS, 1899-1924, at 31 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1976)); PURCELL, supra note 29, at
47. Embedded in the pragmatists' conception of truth and morality was a thoroughgoing
empiricism. Their conviction that ethical evaluations turn upon experience and judg-
ments with respect to utility necessarily required that they treat the concrete data derived
from practice as the foundation for further theorizing.
68. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 435.
69. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 87 (1966) [hereinafter DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION].
70. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 436.
71. Thomas C. Grey, The Colin Raugh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on Law and Amer-
ican Culture: Holmes, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 71 OR. L. Rv. 521, 540 (1992).
72. "For Dewey, the use of the critical intelligence meant applying the scientific
method to all of life's problems in a uniquely human effort to build a better world." Tony
W. Johnson, Classicists Versus Experimentalists: Reexamining The Great Debate, 36 J. GEN. ED.
270, 276 (1985).
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
experience, experimental method, and integral connection with prac-
tice in [the] determination of knowledge .. .
Dewey's notion of democracy was also inherently egalitarian. His
political theory posited the universal membership of all within soci-
ety.74 From this perspective, the responsibility of educators in public
schools and of political actors generally was to insure the maintenance
of those conditions necessary for the active participation of all mem-
bers of the community in the collective enterprise of building knowl-
edge and understanding. 75
Finally, the pragmatist philosophy and egalitarian political theory
of Dewey and his allies generated a particular set of ideas about the
nature and role of public education in a democratic society. Dewey
and the other progressive educational theorists were strongly critical
of the classical tradition in education. Counterposed against the class-
ical tradition's tendency toward "escape from the tasks and duties
which the world of change sets before us, and withdrawal into the
undisturbed peace of a life of contemplation,"7 6 the pragmatists' phi-
losophy of education stressed collective and engaged social action.
Once again rejecting an individualistic escape into the private sphere,
they urged instead a process of "learning by doing"77 designed to "in-
still a sense of collective social responsibility., 78 In so defining effec-
tive educational practice, Dewey and his colleagues directly
repudiated a long-standing distinction between liberal and vocational
education. In part this was the result of their view of education, and
indeed of the pursuit of knowledge more generally, as experiential
and procedural. In addition, however, the collapse of the formerly
distinct categories of thinking and doing was driven by the
73. Dewey, The Higher Learning in America, supra note 52, at 167.
74. "Dewey disputed the claim that liberty and equality were incompatible values.
Equality was simply the demand for a distribution of liberty (power) which was conducive
to the full development of the individuality of everyone in a society." WESTBROOK, supra
note 26, at 436; see also infra text accompanying notes 125-129 (describing Dewey's concep-
tion of the relationship of the individual to society).
75. See Clinton Collins, Should Mortimer Adler's Paideia Proposal Have Been Dedicated
to John Dewey? 13 (Apr. 5, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Educational
Resources Information Center) ("Deweyan progressivism ... begins with the assumption of
universal membership on the part of all willing to participate in the activities of the school
...."). This was to be an inclusive process in which "free social inquiry is indissolubly
wedded to the art of full and moving communication." JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
PROBLEMS 184 (1954) [hereinafter THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS].
76. Folke Leander, John Dewey and the Classical Tradition, 8 Am. REv. 504, 505 (1936).
77. Martin, supra note 54, at 60.
78. Id. at 63.
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pragmatists' belief that traditional liberal education was class-based,
anti-democratic, and exclusionary.7 9
Dewey's writing about education was explicitly political. In The
Educational Frontier, he wrote that "education must operate in view of a
deliberately preferred social order."80 Dewey meant by this that pub-
lic education, if it were truly inclusive and participatory, had the po-
tential to overcome the limitations of class and could serve to
counteract the effects of economic inequalities.81 Above all, he urged
a form of public education that "takes account of social relationships,"
and places study in "a social context."82
Dewey's faith in the plasticity of human nature and commitment
to a conception of knowledge as relative and practical led him to con-
ceptualize education as a dynamic collective process by which students
were helped-and were encouraged to help one another-to continu-
ally adjust to the social environment and, in the process, to effect and
revise the shape of that very social order itself. As he wrote in Democ-
racy and Education: "Our net conclusion is that life is development, and
that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational
equivalents, that means (i) that the educational process has no end
beyond itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational process is
one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming.""3
Dewey's theory of education, and the pragmatist philosophy and
politics that supported it, came under direct attack in Robert Hutch-
ins's 1936 book, The Higher Learning in America.8 4 In this lengthy essay,
Hutchins argued that an excessive vocationalism and an anti-intellec-
tualism grounded in mindless empiricism had perverted higher edu-
cation.85 He expressed deep concern that American university
curricula had become disorganized and chaotic, and he suggested
that the pragmatists' preoccupation with fact gathering and the scien-
79. The notion here was that, in the rigid class-based societies in which classical educa-
tional practice had originated, only the aristocracy was afforded the opportunity to pursue
the pure study of ideas. The laboring classes, by contrast, were excluded from institutions
of classical study, and were relegated to vocational training, if they received any structured
education at all. See id. at 65-67.
80. John A. Dewey, The Underlying Philosophy of Education, in THE EDUCATIONAL FRON-
TIER 287, 291 (William H. Kilpatrick ed., 1933).
81. See Martin, supra note 54, at 63.
82. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 69, at 67. Dewey opposed the "[i]solation
of subject matter from a social context," and supported the integration of "technical sub-
ject matters" with "human activities having social breadth." His definition of "general edu-
cation" was an education both broad and flexible. Id.
83. Id. at 49-50.
84. THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, supra note 51.
85. See id. at 26-27, 38-43.
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tific method had undermined the basic academic mission because this
empirical work had ceased to be directed by any sort of theoretical
perspective.8 6
At its core, Hutchins's critique centered on the scientific natural-
ism that characterized the thinking of Dewey and his allies. He ar-
gued that the relativism, contextualism, and experientialism at the
heart of pragmatic thought rendered it incapable of ordering a sensi-
ble process of education. 7 In their place, Hutchins urged a return to
an Aristotelian metaphysics of first principles and a priori truths. In
this fashion, he argued, the acquisition of all knowledge would be
grounded and guided.88
Hutchins's embrace of Aristotelian metaphysics led him to the
conclusion that human intellect-the power of rational thought-is
the single most important attribute possessed by men and women.
Thus, he believed that humans are distinguishable from the other ani-
mals principally on the basis of their capacity to reason. People, he
insisted, are capable of more than simple evolutionary adaption to the
86. See id. at 65; see also PURCELL, supra note 29, at 147-48.
87. My colleague, Deborah Hellman, has pointed out that empiricism and relativism
are not necessarily linked. A person might argue for the necessity of clear a priori moral
principles and for an empirical approach to finding out how these principles can best be
implemented. Such an approach would not be inconsistent with Hutchins's position that
empirical study should be grounded and guided by a foundational metaphysics. Dewey, on
the other hand, by virtue of his conviction that standards of moral and ethical judgment
must be derived from experience, endorsed both empiricism and a relativistic conception
of truth and justice.
88. See generally THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, supra note 51. "Real unity can be
achieved only by a hierarchy of truths which shows us which are fundamental and which
subsidiary, which significant and which not." Id. at 95.
Hutchins's Higher Learning was remarkable in a number of respects, not the least of
which was the profound shift it signaled in the intellectual stance of this still youthful
thinker. Hutchins had started his academic career as a faculty member at the Yale Law
School, where he was squarely ensconced in the legal realist camp closely associated with
Dewey's pragmatism. "Indeed, Hutchins' mentor, Charles Clark, to whom Hutchins dedi-
cated The Higher Learning in America, described Hutchins as 'the most eloquent leader' of
the movement which marched under the banner of functionalism, behaviorism, legal real-
ism and science." Martin, supra note 54, at 91-92. Over time, Hutchins had become disillu-
sioned with realism and its emphasis on empirical study and the social sciences, most
particularly behavioralist psychology. His shift in emphasis from the hard social sciences to
Aristotelian philosophy was driven by a conviction that law and legal study had to be
anchored in an abiding system of ethics. He
believed that it was necessary to preserve a more traditional, architectonic role for
philosophy, if only to enable the progressive reformer to recognize what a socio-
political problem was. Underlying the diagnosis of every social ill ... were stan-
dards of truth, justice and goodness; that is, the ends to which social change
should aspire.
Id. at 101.
[VOL. 61:13
PUBLIC EDUCATION AS PUBLIC SPACE
environment."9 The ability to think, to exercise a rational intellect,
marks human beings as uniquely capable of "moral, spiritual, and po-
litical growth."90
Given this rationalist humanism, Hutchins was drawn to the con-
clusion that the pursuit of a liberal education should be understood as
intrinsically valuable without regard to any assessment of mere utilitar-
ian ends.91 He also believed that human nature is neither plastic, as
Dewey had taught, nor entirely subject to the constructive force of
social context and culture. 2 As Hutchins put the point: "The nature
of man, which is the same everywhere, is obscured but not obliterated
by the differing conventions of different cultures."" Given his notion
of human permanence, and of a stable identity of principle across his-
torical time and cultural space, Hutchins's educational philosophy
called for an emphasis upon the transmission of a common body of
thought, a canon of great ideas forming the framework for the evalua-
tion of ongoing intellectual work. 4 Thus was born, in collaboration
with his close friend Mortimer Adler, the "great books" curriculum
that shaped St. John's College and that continues to inform educa-
tional and cultural debates today."
With respect to the pragmatists' relativistic notions of truth and
ethics, Hutchins distinguished between what he termed "speculative"
and "practical" judgments.9 6 Speculative matters, he asserted, are ei-
ther objectively true or false, depending upon a conclusion's consis-
tency with universal fact.9" Thus, he explained: "Two + 2 = 4 [must be
true] in ancient Athens, medieval Paris, and modern Chicago ....
In this respect, Hutchins famously stated that "[t]he truth is every-
where the same."99
89. Robert M. Hutchins, Toward A Durable Society, FORTUNE,June 1943, at 159 [hereinaf-
ter Hutchins, Toward a Durable Society].
90. MICHAEL R. HARRIs, FIVE COUNTERREVOLUTIONISTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 137
(1970).
91. See Martin, supra note 54, at 106.
92. See id. at 109.
93. Hutchins, Toward A Durable Society, supra note 89, at 159.
94. Martin, supra note 54, at 109-10.
95. See id. at 128-30 (discussing the "great books" curriculum).
96. Robert M. Hutchins, Civilization and Politics, U. CHI. MAG., Apr. 1939, at 8 [hereinaf-
ter Hutchins, Civilization and Politics].
97. See Martin, supra note 54, at 111. "In speculative matters both the principles and
the conclusions are true for everybody if they are true at all." Hutchins, Civilization and
Politics, supra note 96, at 8.
98. Hutchins, Civilization and Politics, supra note 96, at 8.
99. THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, supra note 51, at 66.
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Similarly, Hutchins's notion of practical judgments was that they
necessarily involved questions of morality, again figured objectively
and not relativistically. In a direct assault upon the pragmatic concep-
tion of ethics, he wrote:
Unless we have the right end before us the means we choose,
the acts we perform, cannot be right. We do not praise inge-
nious murderers or clever thieves. The means they employ
to reach their end may be admirably adapted to their pur-
poses; but this is the only way in which they are admirable.'0°
Hutchins thus argued that a proposition was subject to moral evalua-
tion not in the least because of its likely success in practice, but solely
in terms of its conformity with transcendent principles of right and
wrong.101
In light of Hutchins's repudiation of existential and moral relativ-
ism, his conclusions regarding the purposes of a liberal education and
of the role of educational institutions in democratic society could not
have been more divergent from those of Dewey and the pragmatists.
Essentially, his position was that liberal education was a necessary pre-
condition for the exercise by citizens of the practical judgment re-
quired in a democracy. Although pursuit of education was
intrinsically valuable, without regard to other useful consequences
that might derive from the acquisition of knowledge, Hutchins none-
theless argued that engagement with the great first principles of our
intellectual tradition was necessary to lay the foundation for individu-
als to be able to discern the nature of a just society. 10 2 Thus, unlike
the pragmatists, Hutchins treated questions relating to the content of
higher education as much more important than those respecting the
process by which students engaged one another or through which ed-
ucational institutions were governed.10 '
Hutchins's Higher Learning caused a great stir among educators
and within the popular press. Among those who responded was
Dewey, who offered his critical assessment in a series of articles in the
100. Hutchins, Civilization and Politics, supra note 96, at 8.
101. See Martin, supra note 54, at 112.
102. See id. at 132. Hutchins's position in The Higher Learning was that the purposes of
education are fundamentally apolitical. However, as his debate with the pragmatists un-
folded against the backdrop of a growing totalitarianism across Europe, he increasingly
moved toward the view that a liberal education of the sort he proposed was essential to a
functioning democracy. Id at 184.
103. See id. at 181-82 (noting Hutchins's emphasis "not [on] the supposed disciplinary
value of subjects, [sic] but [on] the need for the student to understand the tradition and
intellectual culture in which [he] lives").
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magazine The Social Frontier.'°4 Dewey pointed out Hutchins's em-
brace of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas, his rejection of "the
unmitigated empiricism [of the pragmatist project] which is a great
curse of modern life,"1°5 and his assertion that "the elements of
human nature are fixed and constant ... [and] are the same in any
time and place."' 6 Given these commitments, he argued that Hutch-
ins's prescriptions for educational reform were elitist and authorita-
rian because they required the adoption of a guiding metaphysics
made up of static and eternal first principles.'0 7 In Dewey's critique,
these Aristotelian principles were not self evident, but were necessarily
selected by Hutchins in lieu of some other set of philosophical prem-
ises. As such, he argued, they represented the imposition of one par-
ticular point of view, to the exclusion of other competing first
principles also available in a pluralist society. As Dewey explained:
There is implicit in every assertion of fixed and eternal first
truths the necessity for some human authority to decide, in
this world of conflicts, just what these truths are and how
they shall be taught. This problem is conveniently ignored.
Doubtless much may be said for selecting Aristotle and St.
Thomas as competent promulgators of first truths. But it
took the authority of a powerful ecclesiastic organization to
secure their wide recognition. Others may prefer Hegel, or
Karl Marx, or even Mussolini as the seers of first truths; and
there are those who prefer Nazism. As far as I can see, Presi-
dent Hutchins has completely evaded the problem of who is
to determine the definite truths that constitute the
hierarchy. 0
8
Hutchins promptly responded to Dewey's attack in his own piece
in The Social Frontier.0 9 Addressing particularly the question of fixed
first principles and the potential authoritarian consequences Dewey
understood to be attendant upon the requirement that some author-
ity would be required to select the metaphysics governing all academic
activity, Hutchins suggested that the philosophical principles around
which his proposed university would organize its curriculum would
themselves be the subject of "development, elaboration, and refine-
ment" by all proper members of the academic community.110 "As a
104. See supra note 52 (listing Dewey's articles in response to Hutchins).
105. Dewey, Rationality, supra note 52, at 71.
106. Id.
107. Dewey, Proposals to Remake Higher Education, supra note 52, at 104.
108. Id.
109. Hutchins, Grammar, supra note 30.
110. Id. at 138.
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matter of fact," he wrote, "fascism is a consequence of the absence of
philosophy. It is possible only in the context of the disorganization of
analysis and the disruption of the intellectual tradition and intellec-
tual discipline through the pressure of immediate practical
concerns."
111
The debate thus framed by Dewey and Hutchins continued to
rage through the late 1930s and into the 1940s, with a widening circle
of supporters from each side taking it up.'12 The fundamental point
of difference between the two camps centered on the question of
whether moral judgments are relative and contingent, as the
pragmatists asserted, or subject to fixed evaluation according to first
principles, as Hutchins believed. "'What ought we to do?' is not a
scientific question," he said. "Science can give us the automobile, the
radio, and the airplane. It cannot tell us how many we ought to have,
who ought to have them, or how they ought to be used."113 Moreover,
argued Hutchins, a resort to philosophy was the only avenue for ad-
dressing the fundamental political questions necessarily raised by the
spread of totalitarian movements in Europe and Asia. If a democratic
social order was worth fighting a war to preserve, then Americans
needed a way to assess the value of, and society's progress toward,
"law, equality, and justice." '114 These aspirations, he said, were incom-
patible with the pragmatists' relativistic notion of truth.
[I]n order to believe in these principles at all we must be-
lieve that there is such a thing as truth and that in these mat-
ters we can discover it .... [T] here can be no experimental
verification of the proposition that law, equality, and justice
are the essentials of a good state.
In order to believe in democracy, then, we must believe
that there is a difference between truth and falsity, good and
bad, right and wrong, and that truth, goodness, and rights
are objective standards even though they cannot be experi-
mentally verified.115
Dewey, by contrast, continued to fight for a pluralist conception, in
which "all truths would be considered tentative and open to change,"
111. Id. at 138-39.
112. This widening controversy is well described by Edward Purcell. See PURCELL, supra
note 29, at 152-58 (describing specifically the involvement of Lippmann and Niebuhr).
113. Robert M. Hutchins & Oliver Cromwell Carmichael, What is an Education? Two
Views of the Question, U. Cm. MAG., May 1938, at 9.
114. Robert M. Hutchins, What Shall We Defend?, VITAL SPEECHES, July 1, 1940, at 546.
115. Id. at 548.
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and "no particular group's ideas would be imposed upon everyone
else."' 16
The contest between Dewey's and Hutchins's visions could not
finally be resolved because it turned on such divergent assumptions
with respect to the definition of truth and the nature of morality. To
conclude that the conceptual gap between Dewey's pragmatism and
Hutchins's rationalist thought ultimately was irreconcilable, however,
does not mean that their exchange cannot be studied closely and
pressed into sharper focus. In the discussion that follows, I attempt
such an examination, in order to demonstrate that, notwithstanding
Hutchins's critique of pragmatism, Deweyan theory does permit moral
and political judgments to be made with respect to identified social
practices.
B. Politics, Ethics, and Community
In order to gain some clarity on the Dewey-Hutchins exchange, it
is helpful to begin with the observation that Dewey's version of prag-
matism was deeply communitarian. As an aid in exploring the signifi-
cance of this feature of Deweyan thought, the following discussion
makes extensive use of work by Stephen Gardbaum on the role of
communitarian theory within moral and political philosophy."l 7 Pro-
fessor Gardbaum's analysis of communitarian thought offers a useful
roadmap for sorting out what Dewey and his colleagues were and were
not claiming with respect to the normative foundations of democratic
society. Such a sorting out, in turn, forms the basis for assessing
whether Deweyan pragmatism can be harmonized with Marc Feld-
man's vision of public education and the politics of public space.
The essential insight offered by Professor Gardbaum is that there
exist within the universe of communitarian thought three distinct and
individually identifiable debates. Gardbaum calls these debates the
"agency debate," the "metaethical debate," and the "political de-
bate."' 1 8 From a methodological point of view, working within this
typology has the advantage of permitting a reader to discern with
some clarity the claims that a particular theorist makes with respect to
each of these debates.
Gardbaum describes the agency debate as concerning "the onto-
logical relationship of the individual to his or her community." 1 9
116. Martin, supra note 54, at 191.
117. Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REv.
685 (1992).
118. Id. at 692-95.
119. Id. at 692.
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The communitarian position with respect to this question is that each
individual's identity is contingent upon his or her group membership.
From this perspective, the community (or communities) to which an
individual belongs is (or are) constitutive of his or her individual iden-
tity.120 Postmodern theorists often capture this position within the
agency debate by asserting that identity is socially constructed, and
therefore claim that no essential self exists apart from or prior to em-
bedded social practice.121 Similar claims can be found within legal
scholarship, especially among some associated with critical legal stud-
ies and other critical theories. These writers frequently emphasize
that legal institutions not only reflect social practice, but also are con-
stitutive of individual consciousness and social relationships. 122
On the other side of the agency debate are social contractarians,
libertarians, and other liberal theorists who view individual identity as
presocial and independent of social process.1 21 "This is the idea that
we are, or are usefully conceptualized as, fully formed and self-suffi-
cient individuals outside of society who assume social and political re-
lationships and obligations only in order to further our own
predetermined (exogenous) interests and values."124
Dewey made clear his position on the question of individual
agency in his 1935 essay, The Future of Liberalism.125 In this piece, he
120. Id.; see alsoJOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 390-95 (1986) (describing the
way society affects individual autonomy); powell, supra note 40 (addressing contemporary
criticism of the unitary and static self).
121. See Handler, supra note 39, at 700; see also infra text accompanying notes 450-456
(describing the postmodern conception of the self).
122. See, e.g.,J. M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991) (reviewing
ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990)) (describing how
social structures affect an individual's experience of legal norms); Robert W. Gordon, Criti-
cal Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984) (summarizing the various contemporaneous
debates among critical legal writers surrounding theory and socio-legal history).
123. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing for a mini-
mal state).
124. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 692. Gardbaum argues that each of these positions is
a purely descriptive claim and that the communitarian stance with respect to the constitu-
tion of individual identity need not be read as inconsistent with traditional liberalism. Id
at 689, 704-05. While this may be true from a formal theoretical point of view, most main-
stream liberal theory does appear to presume the existence of presocial individual actors,
especially given the prescriptive argument for strong boundaries between autonomous pri-
vate individuals and public life generally found within liberalism. See Richard C. Boldt, A
Study in Regulatory Method, Local Political Cultures, and Jurisprudential Voice: The Application of
Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head Start, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2325, 2358-59 (1995). In
any case, the important point for present purposes is that Deweyan pragmatism strongly
endorses the communitarian position with respect to both the descriptive and prescriptive
questions.
125. 11 JOHN DEWEY, The Future of Liberalism, in THE LATER WORKS, 1935-1937, at 289 (Uo
Ann Boydston ed., 1987).
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explained that two key elements of liberal political theory, the notions
of liberty and individuality, ought to be understood as historically con-
tingent, carrying meanings that reflect the political economy and his-
torical circumstances of the period in which liberalism was
established. 126 He argued that treating liberty and individuality as
"immutable absolute truths" renders a set of practical meanings in the
twentieth century more closely associated with "the negative liberty of
laissez-faire capitalism." 1 27 As a consequence, he explained, such a
misreading "transform[s] liberalism into a conservative ideology.' 12
By contrast, Dewey argued that individuality is not intrinsic, but is the
product of one human being's experiences in association with others
within the context of a social environment. He wrote: "Individuals will
always be the centre and the consummation of experience, but what
the individual actually is in his life-experience depends upon the na-
ture and movement of associated life." 129
In light of Dewey's position within the agency debate, it should
come as no surprise that he adopted a very different understanding of
liberty from that commonly associated with traditional liberalism. In
Dewey's usage, liberty is not defined by reference to a set of negative
rights that autonomous rights-holders possess in order to be left alone
to pursue their private self interest. Deweyan liberty is more affirma-
tive; it is defined as the "effective power"3 of individuals to realize
their full potential through active participation in public life. 3 '
Given this reformulation, true liberal society for Dewey requires a sys-
tem of social institutions that support the "creative realization of
human individuality." '32
Dewey's reconceptualization of liberty as effective social power
implicates the second of Gardbaum's three debates within communi-
126. Id. at 290-92.
127. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 432.
128. Id.
129. 14 JOHN DEWEY, I Believe, in THE LATER WORKS, 1939-1941, at 91 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1988) [hereinafter I Believe].
130. 11 JOHN DEWEY, Liberty and Social Contro4 in THE LATER WORKS, 1935-1937, at 360
(Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987) [hereinafter Liberty and Social Control].
131. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at xv.
132. BERNSTEIN, supra note 27, at 140.
Freedom is based on the possibility of human choice, but it involves more than
this possibility. Freedom requires the effective power to act in accord with choice.
... This intimate connection between freedom as choice and freedom as the
power to act in accord with choice requires the deliberate development of those
institutions that will make choice intelligent and action effective.
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tarian theory. This metaethical debate is framed by second-order
claims with respect to the source of values.
It concerns the nature, source, and scope of value and of
normative structures generally, and seeks to answer such typi-
cal questions as: What is the most valid form of argument
concerning moral and political values? Do such values ex-
press anything more than personal preferences? Do we
choose which values bind us?" 3'
Gardbaum identifies three competing positions within this de-
bate. First is "subjectivism," which locates the source of values in indi-
vidual choice or preference. The second is "universalism," which
holds that binding norms exist prior to the establishment of any given
community and apply universally across different cultures and social
circumstances. The third position is "communitarianism," which as-
serts that values are local, contextual, and particularistic.13 4 The typi-
cal communitarian claim within the metaethical debate is both anti-
universalist and anti-subjectivist. Communitarians do believe that
binding norms exist outside of individual preference, but locate the
source of those norms in social practice."' 5
Because the metaethical debate is characterized as addressing a
second-order question, Gardbaum claims that political and moral the-
orists who adopt the communitarian position with respect to the
source of values have said nothing necessary or conclusive with respect
to the content of those norms.' 6 Indeed, the question of which sub-
stantive values ought to govern social practice forms the third and fi-
nal debate identified by Gardbaum, which he terms the political
debate. 37 His position is that a metaethical communitarian can-in
fact, must-endorse noncommunitarian or individualistic values, if
that is what a given community (or community tradition) determines
its governing norms should be.1"'
In forging such a strong separation between the origins and sub-
stance of political and moral values-by distinguishing between a sec-
ond-order metaethical debate and a first-order substantive debate over
the content of values-Gardbaum's analysis refines the terms of the
exchange between Dewey and Hutchins. Some of Hutchins's allies in
the 1930s and 1940s characterized the pragmatist position as subjectiv-
133. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 693.
134. Id. at 705-06.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 698-99.
137. Id. at 695.
138. Id.
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ist, and it was on this basis particularly that the charge was leveled that
Dewey and his colleagues were propounding a purely instrumental
theory. 3 9 The fairer critique, however, was that the pragmatists, while
139. See, e.g., ALLEN TATE, The Present Function of Criticism, in REASON IN MADNESS 3-8
(1941); Lewis Mumford, The Corruption of Liberalismi, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 29, 1940, at 568;
see also PURCELL, supra note 29, at 221-23 (summarizing the views of Tate, Mumford, and
others attacking pragmatism and relativism). Similar charges were directed against the
legal realists. Given their deep commitment to empiricism, their enthusiasm for the social
sciences and a naturalistic understanding of social phenomena, and their unwillingness to
anchor thinking about law through the use of abstract principles or a priori ethical
precepts, it is not surprising that the realists quickly came under attack on the grounds that
their jurisprudence was dangerously instrumental and morally relativistic. Indeed, as Pur-
cell has pointed out, it was inevitable that the law would become an active battleground in
the ongoing struggle between the pragmatist thought of Dewey and the rationalist human-
ism of Hutchins. After all, "[i]t was a field of the greatest social importance, and at the
same time one that had always dealt with broad philosophical questions. More than any
other practical profession, the law was specially concerned with problems of ethics and of
values." PURCELL, supra note 29, at 159.
Although the realism of Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank sought to refocus the think-
ing of legal scholars and others on law as it operated in fact, as opposed to the formalists'
sterile account of law as a rational system driven by clear and stable principles, their oppo-
nents tended to treat the realists and their colleagues as simple legal positivists who de-
fined legality to be coextensive with the actions of government officials. See id. at 161. To
be sure, the realists did question the capacity of the traditionalists to articulate coherent
ethical norms in the abstract, but, like Dewey, many of them also believed that governing
moral values could be identified "out of concrete situations," and could be made "intelligi-
ble only in that context." Id. at 160. Against the backdrop of a growing European totalitar-
ianism, however, the realists' relative preoccupation with the critical portion of their
intellectual program-their critique of formalism and depiction of the legal system in op-
eration-and their concomitant disinterest in the question of how to articulate affirmative
ethical norms in a pragmatic jurisprudence, led many of their opponents to the conclusion
that realism was dangerous and misguided. Id. at 161. In an initial round of criticism,
Dean Roscoe Pound, in a turn that foreshadowed the arguments of Robert Hutchins
against Dewey, questioned whether the realists' faith in empiricism and their dismissal of
the importance of legal doctrine and a priori principle were leading legal thought into an
unworkable nihilism. See Roscoe Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L. REv.
697 (1931). Morris Cohen criticized the realists for "do[ing] away altogether with the nor-
mative point of view in law" and suggested that their project could undermine the ethical
basis for democratic practice. Cohen, supra note 32, at 357. Natural law theorist Lon
Fuller argued that the realists' "rigorous separation of [the] is and [the] ought" had caused
them to obsess over relatively unimportant matters ofjudicial psychology and useless statis-
tics at the expense of what he called moral facts. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF 60 (1940). The consequence, claimed Fuller and others, was that the realists' juris-
prudence was incapable of addressing fundamental questions with respect to the moral
legitimacy of law. If objective notions of truth and morality are impossible, they argued, if
law is identified simply as that which government chooses to do, then the fundamental
prerequisites for the rule of law within a democracy are impossible as well. See PURCELL,
supra note 29, at 163.
The charges of moral relativism and instrumentalism brought a variety of responses
from the realists. In 1940, Llewellyn wrote that empirical practice designed to predict the
actual decisions of actors within the legal system, while important, was not the only task of
law study. Llewellyn's primary concern was with finding rational ways to guide judges when
"justice" and a rule of law conflicted in a particular case. Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and
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not pure subjectivists, still had little that was constraining to say about
the substantive first-order ethical questions that so roiled the United
States and Western Europe during and after the Second World War.
Speaking within the terminology of Professor Gardbaum's typogra-
phy, we can say that Hutchins's concern with pragmatism was that he
understood it to be limited to second-order metaethical questions-or
questions of process-and therefore that it was ungrounded when it
came to the substantive moral and political challenges of contempo-
rary Western society.
While Professor Gardbaum's analysis is fairly elaborate, one use-
ful distinction he draws is between the thinking of liberal com-
munitarians, including Michael Walzer and Richard Rorty, and
"strong communitarian [s] ," such as Hannah Arendt and Alasdair
MacIntyre. Gardbaum explores at some length the important differ-
ences between each of these figures.14' But the feature that maintains
this essential distinction is that liberal communitarians tend to adopt a
communitarian position with respect to the metaethical debate with-
out also endorsing the substantive view that communal forms of politi-
cal association are intrinsically better than liberal political norms.
Strong communitarians, on the other hand, do take a communitarian
position within the political debate, "employing a substantive concept
of community as an alternative to liberal society ... "141
In his book Interpretation and Social Criticism,'4 2 Walzer argues that
the answer to the question "What is the right thing ... to do?" can
only be pursued "within a tradition of moral discourse. '143 By this he
means that questions of moral philosophy must be resolved by refer-
ence to "a community of experience," so that moral reasoning is best
understood as the proper interpretation of a community's commonly
Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REv. 593, 613-14 (1940). Other realists acknowl-
edged the significance of basic notions ofjustice within law, but objected to any characteri-
zation of these concepts as objective, "eternal or unchanging." PURCELL, supra note 29, at
174 (quoting Max Radin, The Education of a Lauyer, 25 CAL. L. REv. 676, 688 (1937)).
Rather, adhering to their basic empiricism, these realists argued that the normative basis
for democratic practice and the rule of law could be found in inherited social practices
defining the culture within which individual judges operate. See, e.g., Radin, supra. These
various responses failed to bridge the conceptual gap that separated the realists from their
critics, just as Dewey's responses to Hutchins failed to provide a basis for integrating prag-
matist and rationalist thought.
140. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 696-97. For example, Gardbaum further divides lib-
eral communitarians into those who adopt a postmodern epistemology, such as Rorty, and
those who "express[ ] a much older tradition," such as Walzer. Id at 694.
141. Id. at 689.
142. MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987).
143. Id. at 23.
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developed meanings, language, and culture.144 But Walzer is not a
universalist with respect to first-order questions of ethics. His position
is that the pursuit of universal norms, including substantive communi-
tarian values, would "have the effect of enforcing a singular over a
pluralist truth .... of reiterating the structure of the ideal common-
wealth in every previously particularist community."14
Walzer's rejection of universal substantive moral and political
norms distinguishes his form of communitarian theory from that of
strong communitarians such as Hannah Arendt.'46 Arendt and other
more recent proponents of strong communitarianism, who often call
their position republicanism or civic republicanism,'147 adopt a sub-
stantive claim that the highest human good is "active citizenship in a
virtuous political community."'148 This is, by definition, a universalist
claim, as it applies with equal force to all societies from contemporary
Western society to the Ancients.
149
Arendt's position, that the substance of the good life is civic prac-
tice in public spaces, is incompatible with traditional liberal theory
because it rejects the impulse to treat politics as merely ancillary to
private endeavor. 5 ' In contrast to mainstream liberal thought, Ar-
endt argued that meaningful individual lives cannot be constructed
out of the pursuit of private self-interest. She believed "that human
beings lack moral self-sufficiency outside the confines of a political
community, and that citizenship and civic virtue are at least necessary
conditions of the good life."15' In order for political discourse to have
144. Id. at 30 n.21.
145. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 393 (1981). Walzer's
position within the metaethical debate enables him to be both a liberal political theorist
and a critic of traditional liberalism. At least within Gardbaum's account, Walzer endorses
the broadly individualistic content of liberal society, including its protection of individual
autonomy and voluntary association and its separation of the public from the private
spheres, precisely because he understands these norms to be the product of the Western
political tradition. See Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 698. At the same time, Waizer's view is
that "liberal theory misrepresents the extent of our communal experience in liberal society
and thereby forces us to misunderstand our personhood. Stripped of its superficial atomis-
tic ideology, liberal society is seen to be constituted by deeply held shared values and com-
mitments that define our specific tradition." Id. at 697-98.
146. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
147. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MAcIr'NTRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM
AND THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982).
148. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 725.
149. See id. at 724, 729-30; see also MAcINmlRE, supra note 147, at 141 (discussing the
Aristotelian theory of the virtues).
150. See Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 724-75.
151. Id. at 749. The strong communitarian position is inconsistent with traditional lib-
eral thought in a second, related way. Because it is a first-order theory, republicanism is
incompatible with traditional liberalism's neutrality toward questions of ethics. One simply
2002]
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this sort of moral function, Arendt explained, it is necessary that pub-
lic life be insulated from the distortions caused by inequalities of
power and access that characterize the "sphere of mundane, everyday
necessity."152 While she believed that such a separation of political
discourse from the mundane world of private self-interest was possi-
ble, Arendt argued that the failure of Western society to maintain this
boundary has yielded a politics concerned primarily with the "admin-
istration of things" rather than with the practice of civic virtue. 153
Mapping John Dewey's moral and political philosophy onto Pro-
fessor Gardbaum's typography is no easy task. While Hutchins criti-
cized Dewey for propounding a moral and political philosophy that
was limited to the metaethical debate, a close reading of Dewey sug-
gests that his position in fact reached beyond the metaethical commu-
nitarianism of Walzer and the other liberal communitarian thinkers,
in that it did attribute first-order normative significance to collective
life.1 54 At the same time, Dewey's response to Hutchins's reliance on
a priori reasoning makes clear that he rejected the sort of universalist
ethics associated with the strong communitarianism of MacIntyre and
Arendt.15 Most importantly, Dewey rejected Arendt's notion that
public discourse could be insulated from the private sphere of every-
day necessity and her related belief that the mundane and the practi-
cal sully politics.156
In some respects the contemporary communitarian writer who
comes closest to Dewey's position on these questions is Jurgen
Habermas. In Professor Gardbaum's typography, Habermas is de-
scribed as a metaethical communitarian because he rejects a universal-
ist position with respect to substantive questions of ethics.' 5 7 Norms
must be understood within the situated context of everyday social
cannot adopt the view that individuals ought to be able to pursue their own conception of
the good life free from unwarranted public interference and simultaneously hold that the
human good is fixed and immutable. On traditional liberalism's neutrality toward ques-
tions of ethics, see WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at xv. Cf Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republi-
canism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 139 (1995) (discussing the conflict
in neo-republican thought between liberals' preference for "government neutrality" and
traditional republicans' preference for "normative government decision making" based
upon "objectively correct moral values").
152. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 716.
153. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 273 (1963).
154. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at xvi.
155. See id. at 410-11; see also supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussing
Dewey's rejection of a priori reasoning).
156. Westbrook reads Dewey as urging the "democratization of all social institutions...
'in which [individuals] physically participate.'" WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434-35 (em-
phasis added).
157. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 712-13.
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practice and cannot be identified or validated on the basis of abstract
principles or a priori truths." 8 Unlike other metaethical com-
munitarians, however, Habermas offers an account in which the valid-
ity of norms turns on more than simply recognizing their source in
community practice and tradition. For Habermas, according ethical
significance to a "local truth" merely because it is the product of col-
lective social practice is to make the mistake of confusing "a validity
claim and a power claim."' 59
Habermas's way out of this dilemma, framed by his rejection both
of universalism and of metaethical communitarianism simpliciter, is to
suggest that the validity of moral claims must turn on what he calls
"communicative reason."16 That is, norms are to be judged valid if,
and only if, they have achieved "a rational consensus in a context of
undistorted communication . "..."161 Much of Habermas's work, in
turn, is devoted to setting out the conditions under which communi-
cative reason can be said to obtain. These conditions, which yield
what Habermas calls an "ideal speech situation," require a kind of
"'deliberative politics"' in which there is broad and relatively uncon-
strained access to the public debate, and in which "a high premium [is
placed] on reason-giving in the public domain."1 62
In Gardbaum's account, Habermas is treated as both a procedu-
ral universalist (within the metaethical debate) and a substantive par-
ticularist (within the political debate). 63 The requirements of
communicative reason upon which the validity of a moral claim turns
are presumably uniform across time and place even though the con-
tent of a valid ethical stance may vary considerably from one commu-
nity to another.164 As Habermas puts it: "The validity claimed for
propositions and norms transcends spaces and times, 'blots out' space
and time, but the claim is always raised here and now, in specific con-
texts, and is either accepted or rejected with factual consequences for
action. 11
5
158. Id. "Like the other metaethical communitarian thinkers . . . Habermas believes
there is a meaningful sense in which 'all truths are local'; there are no disembodied truths
or universals as traditionally understood." Id. at 712.
159. Id. at 713.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 714.
162. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy Isn't What You Think, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at 29
(reviewingJuRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996)).
163. See Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 714.
164. See id.
165. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 323 (Frederick
Lawrence trans., 1987).
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Alternatively, Habermas, like Dewey, can be read as a theorist
whose work throws into question the very distinction between first-
order and second-order ethical questions upon which Gardbaum's ty-
pography rests. 166 From this perspective, while Professor Gardbaum's
analysis helps to press focus on the Dewey-Hutchins exchange, it does
so by forcing the reader to consider the possibility that Dewey's think-
ing elides entirely the process-substance dualism inherent in distin-
guishing first-order questions of ethics from second-order questions of
metaethics. In this respect, it is worth remembering that Dewey re-
jected most analytic dichotomies, favoring instead an approach
founded upon monist thought.16 7 Gardbaum himself hints at a simi-
lar elision in Habermas's project, stating:
The characteristic problem of modernity for Habermas
(showing his newly acquired respect for Max Weber) is the
necessity of "creat[ing] its normativity out of itself," of pro-
viding its own grounding. His solution to the dilemma of
"either universal truths or mere power" is to describe a con-
cept of rationality "that falls prey neither to historicism ...
[nor] stands abstractly over against history and the complex
of social life," a concept that transcends the traditional di-
chotomy by abandoning the Kantian, subject-centered idea
of reason shared by both camps. 68
There is no doubt that Dewey's moral philosophy was antiessen-
tialist and deeply contextual. 169 In his work on ethics, he neither en-
dorsed particular "ends-in-themselves," nor held open the possibility
that such transcendent ends exist.170 Moreover, Dewey consistently
argued that the correct answer to any question of ethics necessarily
depends upon the unique circumstances under which the question
arises. "The business of reflection in determining the true good can-
not be done once for all .... It needs to be done, and done over and
over and over again, in terms of the conditions of concrete situations
as they arise." '171 This fundamental posture exposed Dewey to criti-
cism by Hutchins and others that "[h]e had strong views about how
one should form values, but little to say about which values one should
166. See Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 712-17 (describing Habermas's brand of metaethi-
cal community).
167. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
168. Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 713 (footnotes omitted).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 244-246 (discussing Dewey's antiessentialism).
170. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 417.
171. 7 JOHN DEWEY, Ethics, in THE LATER WORKS, 1932, at 212 (Jo Ann Boydston ed.,
1985) [hereinafter Ethics].
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form." 7 2 In fact, while much of Dewey's writing about moral judg-
ment was directed to questions of process, of developing a methodol-
ogy for making sound judgments, he consciously embedded
substantive ethical prescriptions within his discussions of
methodology.
173
Like Habermas, Dewey sought to steer a path between the horns
of universalist thought on the one hand and positivism on the
other.174 In response to logical positivists such as AJ. Ayer, Dewey
argued that subjectivism is unacceptable because it makes questions of
ethics turn entirely on "the vagaries of power."'175 Dewey believed that
valid ethical judgments necessarily require "intellectual adjudica-
tion," 176 but, at the same time, he was unwilling to ground such a
reasoning process in a priori ultimate ends. 77
In the place of ends-in-themselves, Dewey urged a process of
moral judgment in which action is guided in any given circumstance
by an "end-in-view. ' 178 By this Dewey meant to collapse the distinction
between means and ends, so that the end-in-view identified in a partic-
ular problematic situation functions as the basis of a plan by which
that problem is to be resolved. Once such a resolution has been ac-
complished according to the plan defined by the end-in-view, Dewey
explained, effective moral judgment requires that the consequences
of pursuing that end-in-view be subject to evaluation and assessment
in order to form the basis for the next set ofjudgments to be made.179
Notwithstanding his rejection of ends-in-themselves, Dewey did
acknowledge that the process of evaluation and assessment he urged
as a critical component of moral judgment requires the application of
"generalized ideas," or standards of judgment. 180 Importantly, within
Dewey's moral philosophy these generalized standards are at once
172. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 402.
173. See id. at 402-03.
174. "[Dewey] had spilled a great deal of ink challenging both absolutist claims to a
higher Reason than could judge the truth and falsity of ethical judgments and utilitarian
formulations of a hedonistic calculus which offered a false promise of moral certainty to
ordinary intelligence." Id. at 405.
175. Id. Ayer and other logical positivists believed that "[s] tatements of ethical value"
are not "statements of empirical fact, but rather simple expressions of emotion and hence
could not be judged scientifically to be true or false." Id. at 404.
176. Id. at 405 (quoting 15 JOHN DEWEY, Introduction: The Problems of Men and the Present
State of Philosophy, in THE LATER WORKS, 1942-1948, at 159 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1989)).
177. See id. at 405-06.
178. 13JOHN DEWEY, Theory of Valuation, in THE LATER WORKS, 1938-1939, at 220 (Jo Ann
Boydston ed., 1988) [hereinafter Theory of Valuation].
179. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 408-09.
180. Id. at 411 (setting out health, justice, happiness, and freedom as such standards).
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both empirical and abstract. They are empirical because they are de-
rived not from a priori absolutes, but from prior experience. They are
abstract because they are not the product of any single act of problem
solving, but instead are the residual insights of a number of past
actions.18t
As Dewey explained it, these general principles function "as intel-
lectual instrumentalities in judgment of particular cases as the latter
arise; they are, in effect, tools that direct and facilitate examination of
things in the concrete while they are also developed and tested by the
results of their application in these cases. "182
In his early writing on ethics, and later in response to the criti-
cism of Hutchins and others that his identification of generalized stan-
dards was insufficient to anchor moral judgment, Dewey stressed that
the application of such principles to a concrete instance of moral de-
cision-making requires an agent possessed of sympathetic charac-
ter. i8 3 In so arguing, Dewey did not have in mind an impulse to feel
pity or sympathy for another, which he regarded as "sentimental twad-
dle." '184 Rather, he meant something akin to what some contempo-
rary writers call empathy;' 85 the ability to put one's self in the place of
another, to appreciate another's perspective and experience.'8 6
181. Id. at 412.
182. Theory of Valuation, supra note 178, at 230. Dewey applied this set of ideas to law
through his use of a river metaphor:
Human beings form habits as surely as they perform special deeds, and habits,
when embodied in interactivities, are customs. These customs are, upon the view
here taken, the source of law. We may use the analogy, or if one prefers, the
metaphor, of a river valley, a stream, and banks. The valley in its relation to sur-
rounding country, or as the 'lie of the land', is the primary fact. The stream may
be compared to the social process, and its various waves, wavelets, eddies, etc., to
the special acts which make up a social process. The banks are stable, enduring
conditions, which limit and also direct the course taken by the stream, compara-
ble to customs. But the permanence and fixity of the banks, as compared with
the elements of the passing stream, is relative, not absolute. Given the lie of the
land, the stream is an energy which carves its way from higher to lower levels and
thereby, when viewed as a long run (in time as well as in space) process, it forms
and reforms its own banks.
John Dewey, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS 71, 78-79
(Julius Rosenthal Foundation ed., 1941).
183. See Ethics, supra note 171, at 249-52.
184. Id. at 251.
185. Seejohn a. powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful Speech in a
Democratic Society, 16 LAw & INEQ. 97, 111 (1998) (referring to empathy as "an experien-
tially defined emotional response to the situation of another"); see also Lynne N. Hender-
son, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1574-75 (1987) (criticizing legal decisions
and lawmaking as frequently not having anything to do with understanding "human exper-
iences, affect, suffering-how people do live").
186. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 413-14.
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Putting these elements together, Dewey explained that a sound
moral judgment is one in which the likely consequence of a given
course of conduct as defined by a chosen end-in-view is the "well-being
of all concerned."'1 7 In urging that sympathetic character govern the
process by which ethical questions are adjudicated, Dewey was not sug-
gesting that individuals place the well-being of others ahead of their
own self-interest. He viewed one's own interest and the interests of
others with whom one is associated as reciprocal. Indeed, he rejected
altogether the distinction between self-interest and the well-being of
others, pointing out that such a distinction itself is rooted in tradi-
tional liberal notions of individuality. 88
Dewey eschewed the idea that individuals possess an autonomous
identity outside of community. In place of such a notion, he argued
that the identity and capacity of individual actors always depend upon
their ongoing interaction with others and upon the nature of the so-
cial institutions within which that interaction takes place. 89 Further,
Dewey was convinced that true happiness is "a kind of happiness which
is harmonious with the happiness of others."1 ' In this fashion,
Dewey's communitarian position within the agency debate was linked
conceptually to his conviction that "social life ha[s] intrinsic moral
significance," because it is only within the context of healthy social
institutions that sympathetic character can develop and the well-being
of all can be pursued. 9'
Only when individuals have initiative, independence ofjudg-
ment, flexibility, fullness of experience, can they act so as to
enrich the lives of others and only in this way can a truly
common welfare be built up. The other side of this state-
ment, and of the moral criterion, is that individuals are free
to develop, to contribute and to share, only as social condi-
tions break down walls of privilege and of monopolistic
possession. 192
Intelligent sympathy widens and deepens concerns for consequences. To put
ourselves in the place of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims
and values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they as-
sume in the eyes of an impartial observer, is the surest way to appreciate what
justice demands in concrete cases.
Ethics, supra note 171, at 251.
187. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 413.
188. Id. at 414-15. The traditional liberal position with respect to individuality plays out
both within the agency debate and the political debate.
189. Id. at 433; see also I Believe, supra note 129, at 91.
190. Ethics, supra note 171, at 248.
191. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 415.
192. Ethics, supra note 171, at 348.
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In important respects, Dewey's notion that the development of
individual capacity depends upon the nature of social life places his
work in harmony with Arendt's brand of republicanism.19 At a
deeper level, though, Dewey rejected Arendt's call for a separation of
public life from the world of the mundane and the ordinary. He be-
lieved that the development of morally sufficient individuals requires
the democratization of all social institutions where citizens encounter
one another, including schools, factories, and the like.194
Robert Westbrook, the noted Dewey scholar, has argued that
Dewey's approach to social institutions represents an attempt to rec-
oncile liberalism and radical democratic political theory by redefining
the meaning of liberty.'95 As explained earlier, Dewey equated liberty
with power, the "effective power to do specific things."' 96 Under-
standing liberty in this new affirmative way permitted Dewey to argue
that it is not in tension with the principle of equality, as many tradi-
tional liberal theorists have argued. 9 ' Equality in Dewey's reconcep-
tualized political philosophy means simply that each person in society
must have a sufficient measure of power to insure his or her full devel-
opment as a creative and productive member of the community.'98
Moreover, if equality is "a democratic distribution of [affirmative] lib-
erties," '199 then the role of a democratic politics is to see to it that
social institutions are in place to nurture the development of individ-
ual capacities, and to facilitate the desire of individuals to participate
193. See supra text accompanying notes 146-153 (describing Hannah Arendt's view of
republicanism).
194. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 433-39.
195. Id. at 438. "A liberalism true to these ideals 'must now become radical, meaning by
"radical" perception of the necessity of thoroughgoing changes in the set-up of institutions
and corresponding activity to bring [them] to pass."' Id. (quoting 11 JOHN DEwEY, Liber-
alism and Social Action, in THE LATER WORKS, 1935-1937, at 45 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987)
[hereinafter Liberalism and Social Action]).
196. Liberty and Social Control, supra note 130, at 360.
197. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 436. Westbrook argues persuasively that Richard
Rorty has misread Dewey on this point:
For Rorty, liberal-democratic politics involves little more than making sure that
individuals hurt one another as little as possible and interfere minimally in the
private life of each. There is little in his social or political vision of the communi-
tarian side of Dewey's thinking, nothing of Dewey's veneration of shared experi-
ence.... It is simply dead wrong to read Dewey's liberalism, as Rorty has done, as
celebrating a politics centered on "our ability to leave people alone."
Id. at 541-42.
198. To Dewey: "Equality was simply the demand for a distribution of liberty (power)
which was conducive to the full development of the individuality of everyone in a society."
Id. at 436.
199. Id.
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in the governance of the very institutions within which they lead their
lives.20°
Of course, Dewey did not employ the language of participatory
democracy we have come to associate with Habermas.2° But his insis-
tence on understanding liberty as the effective power to participate
fully in the management of social institutions, and his further claim
that liberty so redefined is entirely compatible with equality in the dis-
tribution of social power, do begin to suggest a not dissimilar poli-
tics.20 2 Dewey's more explicit political writings clearly set out a
critique of industrial capitalism that was based upon his theory of in-
stitutions. 20 3  Like Habermas, who has also chided contemporary
Western society for its failure to maintain effective public spaces
within which public discourse can take place, 20 4 Dewey argued that
"the exploitative possessive individualism fostered by capitalism in-
hibit[s] the formation of the participatory communities of democratic
action essential to self-development and social welfare." 20 5 Dewey's
prescription for this state of affairs was a radical democratic practice
in which social institutions would be reconfigured to reflect the prin-
ciples of liberty and equality he espoused.20 6
Dewey's notion of radical democracy has especially important im-
plications for those who live on the margins of society. In contrast to
Arendt's position that "the [political] predicament of the poor" is that
"their lives are without consequence . . . [because] they remain ex-
cluded from the light of the public realm where excellence can
shine," 20 7 Dewey believed that a weakness of industrial capitalism was
its failure to allocate social power equally in all of the institutions com-
prising associated life, not simply in the sphere of formal political
200. See id. at 438. As Dewey wrote:
[A] 1 those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing
and managing them. The two facts that each one is influenced in what he does
and enjoys and in what he becomes by the institutions under which he lives, and
that therefore he shall have, in a democracy, a voice in shaping them, are the
passive and active sides of the same fact.
11 JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Educational Administration, in THE LATER WORKS, 1935-1937,
at 218 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1987).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 160-162; see, e.g.,JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE AcTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
202. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434-35.
203. See, e.g., I Believe, supra note 129; Liberalism and Social Action, supra note 195.
204. See Gardbaum, supra note 117, at 716-17.
205. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434.
206. Dewey himself described his democratic project as "radical." Liberalism and Social
Action, supra note 195, at 45.
207. ARENDT, supra note 153, at 63.
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practice. 20 8 Functionally, this meant that Dewey concerned himself
with proposing specific alterations in the way particular institutions
were structured and managed, in order to demonstrate how a true
participatory democracy could operate to empower the dispossessed.
The public education system was perhaps the social institution about
which Dewey had the most to say. Here, as elsewhere, he argued that
an egalitarian distribution of material resources was not sufficient.
Real democracy in the field of education required, in addition, an
egalitarian distribution of access to knowledge and an openness to
democratic planning. "It is useless to talk about the failure of democ-
racy until the source of its failure has been grasped and steps are
taken to bring about that type of social organization that will en-
courage the socialized extension of intelligence."209
In important respects, this call for a greater measure of equality
in access to and participation in the field of public education, and
indeed in public life generally, is remarkably consistent with Iris
Marion Young's recent work on the nature of oppression in Western
society.210 Young has argued that oppression has a number of "faces,"
which she identifies as "exploitation," "marginalization," "powerless-
ness," "cultural imperialism," and "violence. ' 211 Similarly, Dewey
wrote explicitly about the corrosive consequences of exploitation
within industrial capitalism.21 2 Moreover, much of his work in the
field of education was directed toward diminishing cultural imperial-
ism, which Young has helpfully described as the "universalization of
one group's experience and culture and its establishment as the
norm."213 Nevertheless, it is with respect to the dynamics of marginal-
ization that Dewey's thinking is most closely tracked by Young's work.
For civic republicans like Hannah Arendt, the value of participation in
public matters inheres in the notion that the practice of civic virtue is
itself constitutive of the human good.214 In contrast, Dewey believed
that an egalitarian distribution of effective power throughout all of
the institutions comprising a community's collective life is necessary
208. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434 (stating that according to Dewey, "[i]n capi-
talist society,... associated life and participatory democracy were stunted and underdevel-
oped, and as a consequence this society produced stunted, underdeveloped, 'lost'
individuals").
209. Liberalism and Social Action, supra note 195, at 39.
210. Iris Marion Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL
RIGHTS READER 66, 69-79 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995).
211. Id. at 69-79.
212. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434.
213. Young, supra note 210, at 77.
214. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
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to insure that each member of the community becomes all that he or
she is capable of becoming. 215 Young's argument against marginaliza-
tion is not limited to the exclusion of some from the practice of polit-
ics. In accord with Dewey, her point relates to the inclusiveness of the
whole society: "Most of this society's productive and recognized activi-
ties take place in contexts of organized social cooperation, and social
structures and processes that close persons out of participation in
such social cooperation are unjust. "216
With this framework in mind, it is possible to draw some conclu-
sions regarding the suitability of Deweyan pragmatism as a theoretical
perspective to ground progressive political practice. Speaking in the
more contemporary language offered by Iris Young, it is fair to say
that Dewey's political writings offer an account by which the oppres-
sion of marginalized people might be overcome. At the center of this
work is Dewey's call for a fundamental restructuring of those social
institutions within which individuals work, play, and learn together, in
order to insure an egalitarian distribution of effective power.217 While
these principles of liberty and equality may not have been a priori
axioms in Dewey's moral and political philosophy, they did serve an
urgent function as necessary corollaries of the positions he took
within the agency debate and the metaethical debate. Like other gen-
eralized standards of moral judgment endorsed by Dewey, his concep-
tion of liberty and equality was both empirical and abstract. Given
their empirical foundations, these political commitments were always
subject to revision and refinement in the light of subsequent experi-
ence; but they functioned as first-order normative commitments all
the same. For this reason, Deweyan pragmatism, properly under-
stood, should be read as reaching beyond a merely instrumental con-
cern with the process by which communities undertake to make moral
judgments. In fact, by moving beyond the process-substance distinc-
tion inherent in Robert Hutchins's critique and described in
Gardbaum's work on communitarian theory, Dewey and his col-
leagues set out a framework of analysis that I believe is consistent with
the kind of progressive democratic practice to which Marc Feldman
was committed.
In summary, although Deweyan pragmatism rejects moral reason-
ing from a priori absolutes, it does offer a method of ethical evalua-
tion that is grounded in standards of judgment that are more than
215. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 434.
216. Young, supra note 210, at 74.
217. See supra notes 198-209 and accompanying text.
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merely instrumental."' These standards may not be permanent or
fixed, as Hutchins demanded, because they are themselves the prod-
uct of ongoing community experience. They are, however, suffi-
ciently stable relative to the shifting sets of circumstances within which
they are employed to provide a reliable basis for evaluating the conse-
quences of a given social practice.219 To conclude in this fashion that
pragmatism does have normative content, however, does not resolve
the further question of whether its methodology is consistent with a
radical democratic politics. It is to this question that I now turn.
II. OVERCOMING CONCEPTUAL CONSERVATISM
In writing about contemporary pragmatists, David Luban has of-
fered a helpful summary of some of the core premises that link to-
gether the various heirs of John Dewey's intellectual legacy.220
Fundamentally, they tend to share a commitment to antifoundational-
218. This conclusion is intended primarily as a descriptive claim. The force of Hutch-
ins's critique of pragmatism-that its lack of a priori principles made it incapable of re-
sponding to evils such as fascism-simply cannot be met unless the reader accepts Dewey's
foundational assumptions with respect to pluralist democracy. For Dewey, Nazi Germany
was an example of the failure of democracy and of the dangers of moral absolutes. For
Hutchins, Hitler's success was evidence of the dangers of a relativistic ethics. In the end, I
think it unlikely that either position can "prevail," if the goal is to find arguments in logic
and reason that exclude the alternative point of view. The best that we can do is to under-
stand how each position operates within its own terms. In the case of Nazi Germany,
Dewey's response was that
Hitler had "inverted democracy" by brutally imposing social unity from above, a
method that stood in dramatic contrast to the methods of democratic consenses
building from below.... Americans who.., sought to fight Hitler by grounding
democracy in a competing set of moral absolutes were playing Hitler's game and
could only hope their battalions were stronger.
WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 522-23 (footnotes omitted).
219. As Dewey put it:
[I] t is argued, the fact that such and such customs and laws have grown up is no
sign that they should exist; it furnishes no test for their value. In short, we come
here upon the large problem of 'value in relation to fact', and upon the conclu-
sion, held by many that they are so separate that standards for judging the value
of what exists must have their source as standards outside of any possible empirical
field.
With reference to this issue, recognition of the ongoing character of social
facts as continuing activities is of fundamental importance. If what are taken to
be social facts are chopped off by being regarded as closed and completely ended,
then there is much to be said on theoretical grounds for the view that the stan-
dard for evaluating them must lie outside the field of actual existences. But if
they are ongoing, they have consequences; and consideration of consequences
may provide ground upon which it is decided whether they be maintained intact
or be changed.
Dewey, supra note 182, at 83.
220. See LUBAN, supra note 31, at 133-40.
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ism, contextualism, antiessentialism, and conventionalism. 22' By an-
tifoundationalism, Luban means a systematic rejection of
foundationalism, or "the idea that claims of a certain category-
knowledge claims, moral claims, political claims-rest on or require
foundations that must be unearthed by philosophical inquiry." 222 An-
tifoundationalists, by contrast, deny that moral judgments, political
commitments, or ascriptions of responsibility require philosophical
foundations.2 23 Instead, they adopt what Luban terms a "contextual"
approach to questions of morality, politics, and the like, in which the
analysis of these matters is understood to be local as opposed to gen-
eral, particularistic as opposed to abstract. 22
4
Necessarily, the pragmatists also question essentialist approaches
to legal, political, and philosophical questions. Given their skepticism
that stable philosophical foundations undergird rational human
thought, and given their conviction that analytic categories are contin-
gent upon context and circumstance, they assert that essential a priori
truths are illusory, and that knowledge-and indeed the language
through which ideas are conveyed-can exist only by virtue of a pro-
cess of social construction.
225
A. The Problem of Conceptual Conservatism
Contemporary pragmatists and others who share a commitment
to antifoundationalism, contextualism, antiessentialism, and conven-
tionalism also share a tendency to be vulnerable to the charge that
their theoretical perspective is inherently conservative. Professor
Luban argues that a rejection of foundationalism in favor of contex-
tual approaches to assessment and justification necessarily causes a
"conceptual conservatism. '2 26 This is so, he explains, precisely be-
cause contextualism requires an inquiry that is both local and particu-
221. Id. at 134.
222. Id. Thus, a foundationalist would be likely to assert that a judgment about some
matter of ethics requires a prior identification of a theory of human nature, or that an
ascription of responsibility requires a prior working out of the theory of free will. Id. at
134-35. Note the affinity between this way of thinking and the rational humanism of
Hutchins described earlier in this Article. See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
223. See LUBAN, supra note 31, at 136.
224. See id. at 136-37. "For the contextualist, justifying all our beliefs is simply not some-
thing that we ever need to do. Justification, like inquiry, is local and not global. It depends
on the context." Id. at 137.
225. Id. at 139-40. In Luban's account: "This is the suggestion that what seem to be
necessary truths about the world, truths that provide foundations for our social practices,
are in reality epiphenomena of those practices. Since nothing metaphysical or founda-
tional lies underneath our practices, the practices themselves are decisive." Id.
226. Id. at 137.
20021
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
laristic. By definition, localized analysis implies that "[a] t any time we
must withhold the overwhelming preponderance of our beliefs and
concepts from critical scrutiny; and whenever we revise our beliefs, we
must revise them minimally."227 Luban's point is that if pragmatism
necessarily involves a contextual approach to reasoning about
problems, then the pragmatist thinker must hold context constant
and cannot include it-or at least not very much of it-in his or her
critical analysis. 2 ' Luban concludes that this aspect of pragmatism is
"inhospitable to radical social thought" precisely because radical theo-
rists want to be able to argue that much or all of culture, which is the
very source of "context," has been constructed in order to serve the
interests of those in positions of power. 229 Thus, an agenda of anti-
subordination which seeks a "massive conceptual revision" of the dom-
inant ideology is, by definition, incompatible with a methodology that
requires the avoidance of any such broad-scale project. 230
Joel Handler put forward a related argument in his 1992 Presi-
dential Address to the Law & Society Association. 23 '1 Although nomi-
nally an assessment of the political consequences of postmodemism,
Handler's analysis applies in important respects to the new
pragmatists and others who are heir to the Deweyan tradition.23 2
Handler's argument proceeds in several steps. First, he explains that
postmodern theory is centered on a process of deconstruction, which
takes as its starting point the notion that there is no necessary fixed
relationship between language and that which it "purports to de-
scribe. '23' Given this problematic relationship between language
signs and the objects and ideas they seek to signify, "it follows that
there is no self-authenticating truth or method or reason that is inde-
pendent of language."23 4 Moreover, because for the postmodernist
words have no necessary fixed relationship to objects or ideas, the
identification of a meaning, by definition, requires the suppression of
alternative possible definitions. "Thus, all meaning has a 'surplus,'
227. Id. at 138.
228. Luban quotes Otto Neurath to press home this point: "We are like sailors who must
rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock and to recon-
struct it there out of the best materials." Id, at 137 (quoting Otto Neurath, Protocol
Sentences, in LoGIcAL PosITvisM 199, 201 (A.J. Ayer ed., 1959)).
229. Id. at 138.
230. Id.
231. Handler, supra note 39.
232. Id. at 702.
233. Id. at 699.
234. Id. Although framed in terms of language theory, this set of analytic moves is anal-
ogous in important respects to the antiformalist argument of the pragmatists that truth is
always contingent upon context and culture. See supra text accompanying notes 222-224.
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that which is repressed along with that which is articulated." 235
Deconstruction, then, is the process of recovering suppressed mean-
ings, with the idea that their very uncovering works to subvert the
forces that made them otherwise invisible.
236
The second step in Handler's account involves the application of
these postmodern theories of deconstruction and surplus meaning to
the problem of the subject. Given that the act of naming anything is
inherently an assertion of power, Handler explains, postmodern the-
ory necessarily regards the assigning of social identities as itself a con-
237tingent ideological process. Neither race nor class nor gender nor
sexual orientation can be regarded as an essential category because
each apparent unity suppresses as much meaning as it conveys.238 In
Handler's words: "There is no unified essence. Rather, the
postmodern subject is a plurality of contingent social, political, and
epistemic relations. Moreover, these relations are constantly subject
to rearticulation. Because there are no a priori relations based on
hegemonic practices, agents are only contingently allied in more or
less stable arrangements."239
The third step of Handler's account places this idea of the
"decentered subject"240 at the heart of postmodern politics. He points
out that, without a conception of the self as unitary and essential,
there is little possibility of developing a "common or totalizing dis-
course," such as class or race consciousness, around which to organize
a politics of anti-subordination.241 Consequently, he concludes that
postmodernist politics is "disabling," in that it undermines the "com-
monality of struggle and social vision" required for effective social
change movements. 242
It is at this point in Handler's discussion that familiar themes
enter, especially the claim that postmodernism's antifoundationalism
and antiessentialism render moral judgments impossible and lead to
"unbridled relativism."2 43  An important strategy employed by
postmodernists for avoiding this pure instrumentalism, he explains,
has been to "embrac[e] the American pragmatism of James and
235. Handler, supra note 39, at 699.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 700.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 701.
242. Id. at 698.
243. Id. at 702.
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Dewey."244 The fit is a happy one because pragmatism shares
postmodernism's antipathy toward foundationalism and essentialism.
In addition, the pragmatist tradition brings an empirical experimen-
talism to the equation, which, it is claimed, permits the postmodern
pragmatist to move beyond instrumentalism and moral relativism. As
Handler puts it: "Postmodernists use pragmatism to deny that contin-
gency is the equivalent of indeterminacy." '245 Indeed, Handler quotes
a leading contemporary pragmatist who explains: "All the major prag-
matist figures accepted and asserted the importance of general princi-
ples and systematic thought; they insisted only that the test of
abstractions must be their usefulness for action and concrete
inquiry."246
In the end, however, Handler reaches a conclusion not unlike
Luban's. The antifoundationalism and antiessentialism of
postmodern pragmatism so undermine the integrity of categories
such as class, race, and gender that it simply is impossible to develop a
"Grand Narrative," which he believes is essential for a transformative
politics of the left.247 To be sure, pursuing the deconstructive project
does have the potential to uncover "previously unnoticed implications
of culture that impute a false necessity to the social order and, particu-
larly, the legal order."248 But, in Handler's view, this approach does
not offer as well a "positive theory of institutions," which means that it
"cannot come to grips with institutionally based power," and cannot
serve as the basis for collective action in any concrete manner.249
B. Contextual Thinking And Progressive Politics
Given that both pragmatist theory and postmodern theory are
characterized by antifoundationalism and antiessentialism, and given
244. Id.
245. Id. at 704.
246. Id. at 703 (quoting Thomas Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787,
824 (1989)).
247. Id. at 726. "[T]he opposition is not playing that game... everyone else is operat-
ing as if there were Grand Narratives." Id. Moreover, "the individualistic Grand Narrative
of liberal capitalism continues to mask the institutionalized basis of racism." Id. at 727.
248. Frank Munger, From The Editor, 26 LAW & Soc'y REv. 693, 694 (1992).
249. Handler, supra note 39, at 724.
The contemporary stories are about individuals, in the most marginalized spaces,
engaging in very small acts of defiance, and, for the most part, very little if any-
thing happens. The authors, at best, are extremely reluctant to draw common
connections, to talk about the possibilities of collective action in any concrete
manner, or even to suggest middle-level reforms, let alone reforms at a more
societal level.
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that both are deeply contextual, the observations of Luban and Han-
dler that neither is capable of serving as the theoretical basis for a
broadly transformative social movement appear well founded. In
Handler's analysis, the most that postmodern political theorists have
to offer as an alternative to large-scale political movements driven by
grand narratives of class solidarity is the possibility of local acts of resis-
tance and subversion that hold little potential to transform fundamen-
tally the status quo allocation of resources and power.25° In Luban's
account, as well, it appears that those seeking to build a progressive
left politics on the basis of pragmatist theory are doomed to accom-
plish only incremental reforms in the narrow spaces opened up by the
contingent, particularistic methodology envisioned by Dewey and his
contemporary followers.25'
This gloomy assessment may only be half right. Even if tradi-
tional structuralist theories and the grand political struggles they envi-
sion are inconsistent with pragmatism and postmodern thought, it
may be a mistake to suggest that limited, largely dispirited, acts of lo-
cal resistance are the only possible alternatives. 252 As Michael Mc-
Cann has argued, relatively small-scale acts of opposition to
entrenched power often serve as the first steps toward larger social
change movements. 253  Indeed, a number of contemporary
pragmatists and postmodern theorists have argued that a significant
transformative potential inheres in a post-structuralist politics that is
located in the "public spaces" where individuals, including those with
relatively little social and political power, engage in the process of con-
250. See id. at 712-15 (noting that post-modem protest is more likely to be at the level of
a "social work" encounter than a result of "organized political forces"). Characteristic of
this assertion is Professor Lucie White's story of the welfare recipient, Mrs. G. See Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs.
G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1990).
251. See LUBAN, supra note 31, at 138 (concluding that "pragmatic philosophy" is "inhos-
pitable to radical social thought").
252. See McCann, supra note 38, at 740-41 (disputing the accuracy of Handler's charac-
terization of pragmatist approaches to reform, and arguing that the new modes of "local
resistance" can have merit).
253. Id. at 741. McCann bases this conclusion, in part, on the work ofJames Scott. He
describes Scott's work as follows:
Ongoing rituals of resistance thus are not simply a resigned alternative to trans-
formative politics. Rather, they often provide rehearsals of opposition that pre-
pare the way for bolder challenges-what he calls 'political breakthroughs'-in
more propitious moments. At such times, 'hidden transcripts' developed quietly
and privately over long periods are unveiled as potentially unifying visions of col-
lective action.
Id. (discussing JAmss C. ScoTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF REsISTANCE 203-23 (1990)).
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structing social identities.254 In these accounts, because social identity
is constantly in the process of being constructed and revised through
ongoing interaction, the possibility of contesting dominant categories
of meaning is always present. "People are never merely passively sub-
ordinated, never totally manipulated. Opposition is always possible
within alternative practices, structures, and spaces.
255
Some of these new pragmatist theorists, most prominently Cor-
nell West, have argued that the possibility of a radical, pluralist demo-
cratic practice, centered on a discourse of shared experience within
invigorated public spaces, was identified in Dewey's original work on
democratic theory and public education.256 Others, associated with
feminist theory, have described a connection between Dewey's work
and contemporary efforts at consciousness raising, which they define
as the "concrete methodology" by which shared meanings and shared
experiences are communicated within public spaces.25 v
In order to assess the general argument that pragmatistism and/
or postmodernism are incapable of grounding an effective transform-
ative left politics, it is necessary to investigate two subsidiary claims
that are embedded within this larger conclusion. The first claim is
that the provisional and contextual theorizing characteristic of prag-
matism and postmodernism typically fails to provide a meaningful ac-
count of the institutional structures that operate to manage the
allocation of power in society.258 The second is that an antiessentialist
understanding of social identity makes impossible the formation of
social movements structured along the lines of class, race, gender, and
the like.259
With respect to the first of these claims, it certainly appears to be
the case that pragmatist and postmodern thought is inconsistent with
a vision of institutions as "top-down, state-centered command struc-
tures."260 However, to say that pragmatism and postmodernism reject
254. See Handler, supra note 39, at 701; see also Stanley Aronowitz, Postmodernism and
Politics, in UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNisM 55-62 (Andrew Ross ed.,
1988).
255. Handler, supra note 39, at 700.
256. See WEST, supra note 59, at 103.
257. Handler, supra note 39, at 706 (quoting MargaretJane Radin, The Pragmatist and the
Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1708 (1991)). In addition, some feminists have developed
an approach called "standpoint" theory, which envisions transformative political move-
ments "in terms of potential alliances constructed through interaction among differently
situated citizens rather than through the acceptance of an overriding meta-narrative and
singular identity." McCann, supra note 38, at 746-47.
258. See Handler, supra note 39, at 719-20.
259. See id. at 722-23.
260. McCann, supra note 38, at 734.
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this traditional structuralist account of institutions is different than
suggesting that they permit no analysis of social institutions whatso-
ever. As discussed in the preceding section, Dewey's political philoso-
phy was deeply concerned with the role that a wide range of
institutions play in shaping the lives of individuals in everyday prac-
tice. 261 Moreover, a number of postmodern theorists have offered an
analysis of institutions, described as "complex webs of relational prac-
tices" rather than as rigid fully formed social structures.262 In the best
of these accounts, postmodern writers have attended to the social and
historical frameworks within which particular claims arise, treating
these institutional features as essential elements of their theorizing. 263
Postmodernism may reject grand narratives or totalizing discourse,
but that does not mean that it rejects altogether the value of institu-
tional analysis. 64
With respect to the limitations imposed by an antiessentialist un-
derstanding of identity, Handler's critique may be overstated as well.
Taking to heart the injunction to treat analytic categories as provi-
sional and subject to revision, it is still possible to employ traditional
notions of class, race, gender, and sexual orientation within an effec-
tive critical analysis. Simply because one rejects the possibility of a
totalizing discourse-the insistence that "all forms of domination are
entirely reducible to class conflict"265 -does not mean that one is pre-
vented from seeking to understand the ways in which power and privi-
lege operate pursuant to identifiable patterns within the context of a
given culture.266
261. See supra text accompanying notes 189-200.
262. McCann, supra note 38, at 734. To be fair, while defending postmodern theory
against Handler's critique, Professor McCann does acknowledge that too many
postmodern scholars fail to include a well-thought-out institutional analysis and thereby
"provide an inadequate mapping of the broader relational environment in which resis-
tance is embedded." Id. at 743.
263. As Allan Hutchinson has explained: "As all claims are located within a dynamic set
of social practices, postmodernism insists that all theorizing pay attention to the structural
circumstances of that social milieu.. . ." Hutchinson, supra note 49, at 779.
264. Hutchinson further asserts, "Provided that it is suitably provisional, revisable, and
contextual, such theorizing is at the heart of a transformative political praxis." Id.
265. Id. at 784.
266. In Hutchinson's words:
Totalizing politics are unrealistic and unrealizable. Grass-roots engagement is
better able to grasp and transform the complex and diverse intersecting forms of
oppression. Sexism and racism might be global in existence and sweep, but their dyna-
mism is local in operation and effect. Oppression is universal, but its modalities are
particular.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Antiessentialist analyses must come to terms with the impact of
socially constructed identities if such analyses are to be useful in help-
ing to direct an effective program of reform. Individuals and groups
occupy cognizable social positions that require systematic study, even
if these features are more dynamic than traditional political theory
suggests. This lesson has been an important feature of critical race
theory for some time, and its importance more generally should not
be overlooked.267
Attention to context-"to the local circumstances of disputes, to
the situated places in which people exist"268-need not lead to an un-
due regard for the status quo, as Luban suggests. It may be that prag-
matism "values existing tradition as one component of the web of
coherent beliefs and activities that comprise our culture,"269 but the
pluralist impulse of John Dewey's work also reminds us that Western
society is made up of many different traditions, each of which is enti-
tied to be heard in the process by which social meaning is created.27°
If Iris Young is correct that two of the principle features of oppression
are marginalization and cultural imperialism,27 t then a politics di-
rected toward diminishing those processes ought to be regarded as a
coherent pragmatist practice. That politics would still seek to "create
new and better stories that fit safely within the system of prior narra-
tives," 272 but the range of eligible narratives would be expanded dra-
matically to include many stories that are not currently a part of the
governing discourse.
III. PUBLIC EDUCATION AS PUBLIC SPACE
In the preceding two sections of this Article I have attempted to
explore each of the critiques that necessarily confronted Marc Feld-
man in his efforts to apply pragmatist theory to a progressive politi-
cal/legal practice. In this section, I return to Marc's specific project
with respect to public education. The discussion that follows is in
267. See, e.g., Kimberlh Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1384-87 (1988); Jayne
Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 441 (Kimberl6
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
268. Hutchinson, supra note 49, at 785.
269. Sherry, supra note 36, at 1112.
270. Cf Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983) (arguing that norms, including legal norms, are made coherent
within a shared narrative tradition, but that, because multiple interpretive communities
often exist within a single political jurisdiction, the legal system must sometimes rely on
coercive force).
271. See supra text accompanying note 211.
272. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 643 (1994).
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three parts. First, I describe why Marc directed his attention generally
to city life, and why he sought to work in urban public schools. Then,
I discuss the shifting societal function that public schools have played
over time and the institutional features that best match their current
role, giving special attention to the characteristics of the schools
within which Marc worked during his sabbatical. Finally, I take up two
specific disputes that currently are at play within public education.
Each of these disputes has been framed, at least in part, as a legal
question. Drawing upon the insights provided in the two preceding
sections of this Article, I conclude by offering some tentative sugges-
tions about these questions rooted in the notion that public educa-
tion, particularly in cities, is crucial public space.
A. Cities And Public Space
Marc Feldman's concern over what he perceived to be a retreat
from civic life was especially focused on cities. He believed that urban
environments hold a special potential for fostering authentic dis-
course between individuals and groups who share little except a com-
mon physical space. At the same time, Marc understood that a
powerful set of contrary instincts pushing toward social isolation often
find expression in urban planning and design decisions. In an un-
published paper, he wrote:
In bounding, marking, and fixing space, we exercise author-
ity and possibly control; in turn, we feel comfortable and
safe. This is a world into which others do not intrude unless
invited. But, in separating to create order and to gain con-
trol, we lose connection. In our flight from otherness, that is
difference, we have achieved neither community nor inti-
macy; instead, we have added to our isolation. 273
Marc's work in this area drew heavily upon the writing of social
psychologist, Richard Sennett.2 74 Marc argued that the diminution of
public space and the avoidance of civic life both are driven by an in-
herent anxiety over the prospect of encountering others who are
strangers. In Marc's account:
We experience difference as painful, not stimulating.
We experience difference as weakness and dysfunction and
as something to be overcome. When we are in a crowd or
273. Marc Feldman, Untitled Working Paper 9 (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
274. RICHARD SENNETr, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL LIFE OF
CITIES (1990).
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walking along a city street, we are defensive and on guard.
We are constantly "humbled." We perform a kind of pedes-
trian ballet. We avert our eyes from making contact with the
eyes of others; as strangers we have no right to talk to each
other. We are in the presence of others but we are alone
and isolated.
The materials, bounds, and functions of the urban land-
scape, like social relations, have become increasingly rigid.
The "atomizing of the city" means that there is less and less
of the once-characteristic mix of functions and activities
within the same geographic area. Instead, there is increasing
division, separation, and isolation. Lost is the 18th century
ideal of "Bildung"-"an ideal in which the life of an individ-
ual became psychologically complete through the same acts
that integrated the individual into society." Instead, in our
flight from difference and conflict, we have taken refuge and
sought meaning in increasingly local and interior ways.2 75
The impulse to seek refuge from strangers, and the impact of this
impulse on land use planning and urban design decisions, is the sub-
ject of important work by Jerry Frug.2 76 In a recent article entitled The
Geography of Community, Frug argues that current governmental poli-
cies promote the division of American metropolitan areas "into dis-
tricts that are so different from each other they seem to be different
worlds. '2 77 In Frug's view, these divisions along lines of race, class,
and ethnicity diminish the potential of cities to be places where "the
being together of strangers" can take place. 278 For Frug, as for Marc
Feldman, this process of separation and homogenization permits res-
idents "to avoid dealing with each other. '279 Employing the language
of Sennett, Frug argues that such avoidance is adolescent because, like
adolescents who "fear being overwhelmed by life's painful uncertain-
ties and complexities," it permits people to "organize their lives to pre-
clude exposure to the unknown or the bewildering. 28 °
275. Feldman, supra note 273, at 11-13 (footnotes omitted) (quoting SENNETr, supra
note 274, at 148).
276. Frug, supra note 13.
277. Id. at 1047.
278. Id. at 1048 (quoting IRIs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
237 (1990)).
279. Id. at 1052.
280. Id.
Sennett's work is a sustained critique of this psychological and social phe-
nomenon. He finds it manifested not only in the defense of homogeneous sub-
urbs but also in the revolutionary's (and the reactionary's) intolerance for
dissent, the history of city planning, the increasing intensity of family life, and the
aesthetics of the modernist city. The more widespread the phenomenon, how-
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By contrast, Frug proposes a vision of urban life that exploits the
full potential of cities. 28 In this conception, the city is defined as "the
locus of a peculiar social situation: the people to be found within its
boundaries at any given moment know nothing personally about the
vast majority of others with whom they share this space."282 Rather
than regarding this "world of strangers"283 as problematic, Frug sug-
gests that it is well suited to serving the values he terms "variety, eroti-
cism, and publicity. ' 284 Frug further explains:
Social differentiation without exclusion means the formation
of a multiplicity of group affinities-ethnic, gay and lesbian,
religious, and so forth-in an atmosphere that promotes
their intermingling. Variety adds to this mix a diversity of
activities within each city neighborhood and a differentiation
between neighborhoods, thereby producing a distinct sense
of place when traveling from one location to another. Eroti-
cism stresses the pleasure and excitement derived from the
unusual, the strange, the surprising; it includes not only the
stimulation of people-watching but also of architectural and
commercial variety. Publicity refers to the feelings generated
when entering a public space-a space that, because it is
open to anyone whatsoever, provides exposure to opinions
and cultures very different from one's own.285
Frug urges a policy of "community building" that rejects the im-
pulse to seek relationships only with others who are like US. 286 In
these terms, community building "requires not cultivating a feeling of
oneness with others but fostering a recognition that one has to share
one's life with strangers .... ,,287 The experience of sharing one's
place with others who are different may produce anxiety, but it also
holds the promise of stimulating the development of social identities
that recognize the claims of "others" to the shared physical and cul-
ever, the more insistent the question becomes: What's wrong with these purified
forms of identity? Sennett's response is that they create "a state of absolute bond-
age to the status quo" and, as a result, limit people's lives. A reliance on stability,
coherence, and order inhibits openness to experience: It undermines one's abil-
ity even to absorb, let alone enjoy, the flux and variety the world has to offer.
Id. at 1053 (footnotes omitted).
281. Id. at 1049-51, 1077-81 (discussing the role of the city in community building and
the values associated with city life).
282. Id. at 1049 (quoting LYN H. LOIaAND, A WORLD OF STRANGERS: ORDER AND ACTION
IN URBAN PUBLIC SPACE 3 (1973)).
283. Id. (quoting LOFLAND, supra note 282, at 3).
284. Id. at 1051.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1049.
287. Id.
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tural resources that comprise the community.288 As Iris Young has put
it: "City dwelling situates one's own identity and activity in relation to
a horizon of a vast variety of other activity, and the awareness that this
unknown, unfamiliar activity affects the conditions of one's own. "289
If we accept John Dewey's fundamental premise, that democratic
practice is essentially the resolution of social disputes by "free inter-
course and communication of experience,"290 then it follows that this
politics depends upon the existence of a vibrant civic life, which in
turn requires public spaces within which the constructive work of so-
cial discourse can take place.
In Marc's view, some of the most fertile social spaces available for
fostering such a discourse are marked out by the institution of public
education, particularly in large urban areas. 29' The remainder of this
Article offers some observations about this conception of public
education.
B. The American Common School And Uncommon Alternatives
In his seminal 1951 study of public education in the United
States, The American Common School, Lawrence A. Cremin traces the
history of the common school against the backdrop of American dem-
ocratic principles and political institutions.29 2 Cremin argues that
American public schools were understood in their inception as "com-
mon" not because they were intended for common people or "the
masses," but because they were designed for everyone without regard
to economic class or social station.293
Within this rhetorical account of the American tradition of the
common school, there are at least two fundamentally divergent ways
in which to view the political function of public educational institu-
tions. The first perspective, which evokes some of the thinking of
Robert Hutchins, proposes that public schools exist primarily as a ve-
288. YOUNG, supra note 278, at 238-39 (discussing the possibility of "social differentiation
without exclusion" in urban life).
289. Id. at 237-38.
290. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 69, at 99.
291. john powell made a similar observation in his work on the connection between
segregated housing and segregated education in the United States. See powell, supra note
10, at 792-93.
292. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION
(1951).
293. George A. Counts, Foreword to CREMIN, supra note 292, at viii. It is important to
temper Cremin's enthusiasm for the democratic tradition of public education in the
United States with a reminder of the practice of racial segregation that marked, and con-
tinues to mark, public schools in many American communities. See generally ARMOR, supra
note 10 (discussing public school desegregation).
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hicle by which certain skills, information, and ways of thinking can be
inculcated uniformly across the citizenry of the United States.29 4 The
alternative perspective, which its proponents often identify with the
educational theory of John Dewey, describes public schools as public
spaces in which "children of different backgrounds and experiences
come together."295 In this alternative account, although the formal
transmittal of information and skills is seen as important, the negotia-
tion of multiple perspectives and conflicting claims is held out as the
primary work to be accomplished.296 Employing the dynamic concep-
tion of public education proposed by Dewey, advocates of this per-
spective assert that well-functioning public schools permit "the views
and experiences of both the dominant group and minority groups to
meet, informing and transforming each other."297
In a series of essays published in the 1960s and '70s, education
theoristJoseph Featherstone provided a useful summary of the growth
of public education in the United States and parts of Western Eu-
rope.298 Featherstone reported that the widespread development of
schools as formal institutions of mass learning took place in the nine-
teenth century, at a time when children were ceasing to be an integral
part of the broader economy.299 As these new schools supplemented
other educative elements in the community, including the family, the
village community, and religious institutions, an older view of educa-
tion as something that occurs in many places over a lifetime was re-
placed by the notion that education mostly occurs during childhood
and mostly takes place within the setting of formal educational institu-
tions. ° Featherstone concludes that this shift led schools to become
"age ghettos," with the consequence that few adults were engaged in
294. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 151, at 156-82.
295. powell, supra note 10, at 792-93.
296. See id. at 782-85 (arguing for the integration rather than the desegregation of pub-
lic schools).
297. Id. at 785.
298. Marc Feldman was particularly taken with the work of Featherstone, an essayist and
education theorist of the first order. In reviewing Marc's papers after his death, I discov-
ered an extensive file containing dozens of articles and book reviews written by Feather-
stone during the 1960s and '70s. In one of his last planning memos, Marc indicated that
he expected to begin the process of sorting out his sabbatical experiences by writing some
short essays modeled on Featherstone's approach to education scholarship. Memo from
Marc Feldman, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law, to Donald Gifford,
Dean, University of Maryland School of Law (Mar. 7, 1997) (on file with author).
299. Joseph Featherstone, Youth Deferred, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 1974, at 23 [hereinaf-
ter Featherstone, Youth Deferred].
300. Id.
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educating children and few children were exposed to adults other
than their teachers and immediate family members. °1
In the early twentieth century, another shift took place, especially
in the design and conception of secondary schools. Featherstone ex-
plains that the progressive movement in politics and educational
thought was undertaken against the backdrop of a profound change
in the function of American secondary schools.30 2 Schools were
changing from "elite preparatory institutions to mass terminal institu-
tions. "303 With this development, the segregation of young people was
extended to older children, and an internal system of age grouping
functioned to deny students "valuable contacts with people of other
ages. ' '130 In the 1950s, the role of secondary education evolved fur-
ther, with many high schools beginning to function as "mass college
preparatory institutions," rather than as terminal educational
institutions.30 5
The 1950s and '60s also was the period in which a grudging im-
plementation of Brown v. Board of Education's desegregation principle
took place. 30 6 That process of dismantling an elaborate system of ra-
cially segregated public schooling was never fully accomplished, in im-
portant respects because of the Supreme Court's refusal to permit
inter-district remedies.3 0 7 More recently, education in the United
States has become even more segregated by race and by class, due to
large-scale patterns of residential segregation, "white flight" from
many urban public schools, and the diminishing resolve of federal
courts to implement Brown.3 0 ' The result of this resegregation has
been that many of the secondary schools that serve racial minorities
and persons in poverty have continued to function as terminal institu-
tions, while those serving white, more affluent children seek to pre-
pare students for college. 30 9 As Featherstone wrote in 1974:
301. Id.
302. Joseph Featherstone, Teaching Children to Think, NEW REPUBuC, Sept. 9, 1967, at 16
[hereinafter Featherstone, Teaching Children to Think].
303. Id.
304. Featherstone, Youth Deferred, supra note 299, at 23.
305. Featherstone, Teaching Children to Think, supra note 302, at 16.
306. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
307. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (finding that a District Court's remedial
plan, which attempted to attract non-minority students to a minority school district, ex-
ceeded the District Court's discretion because it was an interdistrict remedy to an intradis-
trict violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (prohibiting a District
Court from imposing a multi-district, area-wide remedy for single-district racial
segregation).
308. See powell, supra note 10, at 752-61.
309. Joseph Featherstone, Youth Deferred-l, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1974, at 25 [here-
inafter Featherstone, Youth Deferred-Il].
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[S]chools do many things: they baby-sit, teach knowledge,
skills and work habits, give jobs to grownups, introduce the
young to their peers, and provide them with the wherewithal
to break free of family and locale. They also accredit one
pool of students for elite careers and assign another pool to
less august futures."1 °
The reality of this dual-track system has colored debates between
academic traditionalists and reformers at least since the start of the
twentieth century. Featherstone argues that the best of the "commu-
nity-centered" private schools influenced by John Dewey's progressive
education theory succeeded in breaking down barriers dividing one
subject of study from another and making the larger community a
part of the curriculum."' By contrast, he explains, the progressive
movement in public education was "deeply conservative, ' 1 2 in that its
most significant effects were the adoption of scientific management
systems for school administration and "life adjustment" curricula for
those students tracked separately from the college bound.313 While
"shattered fragments of John Dewey's dream did enter the [public
school] curriculum, (for better or worse) .. .what we call progressive
education was never [really] tried. 31 14
In light of this history, in which efforts to make public education
more practical and relevant too often yielded separate tracks for the
underprivileged,3"5 Featherstone approached new reform proposals
offered in the mid-1970s with considerable caution. Recognizing that
"it is unhealthy to cluster the young for so long in the bureaucratic
institutions called schools," ' 6 these reformers called for a variety of
measures designed to help students learn to take responsibility for the
welfare of themselves and others, to learn through action and experi-
ence, and to spend more time with children of different ages and with
adults.31v In general these reform proposals provided for more stu-
dent choice, flexibility and informality in schooling, including more
310. Id.
311. Featherstone, Teaching Children to Think, supra note 302, at 16.
312. Id. at 17.
313. Featherstone, Youth Deferred, supra note 299, at 25.
314. Featherstone, Teaching Children to Think, supra note 302, at 17.
315. Featherstone, Youth Deferred, supra note 299, at 25; see also Featherstone, Teaching
Children to Think, supra note 302, at 18 (noting that "tracking" results in social inequalities
in England and segregation in America).
316. Featherstone, Youth Deferred, supra note 299, at 23.
317. See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVIsORY COMMITTEE,
YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD 1-7 (1974) (examining the process of "transforming
children into adults," and suggesting "alternative environments" for educating youth).
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work-study, and other initiatives designed to reduce the separation be-
tween school and the outside world."'
Featherstone's response to these proposals nearly thirty years ago
rings with authentic insight today. While endorsing the reformers'
call for smaller, less bureaucratic schools, and for finding more oppor-
tunities for older students to help teach younger children, he ex-
pressed the concern of a good Deweyan pragmatist that many of the
proposals failed to attend to context; that is, the considerable varia-
tions in structure and local culture that characterize individual
schools and school systems."' "The real issue," he wrote in 1974, "is
whether we can replace the swollen and pathological institution we
have with something humane, voluntaristic and pluralistic." 0
Marc Feldman took up this call to context in the way he arranged
his sabbatical project. After working through the many responses he
received to his initial written inquiries to leading education reformers
and thinkers, 21 Marc decided to spend his time working in the New
York City public school system. Although the New York City public
schools comprise a vast and complicated bureaucracy, Marc had been
told by a number of his contacts that public education is "'on the
table' [in New York City] as part of the political discourse in a way that
it is not in most other cities."322 At the time Marc chose this site for
his work, a new schools chancellor, Rudolph Crew, had recently been
appointed to replace an equally high visibility leader, Raymond Cor-
tines. 23 To Marc's mind, this shift "represented a fundamental
change in educational philosophy, leadership and governance" of the
school system, as well as a profound change in the "political access
and influence" of the chancellor.3 24
Marc arranged to teach at two "new" high schools.3 25 These
schools are deliberate alternatives within the larger New York City
school system. Instead of enrollments of 3000 to 4000 students, they
have fewer than 400 students.3 26 They had been founded through the
initiative of parents, community leaders, and teachers, yet their under-
318. Id. at 145-75 (describing proposals for reform).
319. Featherstone, Youth Deferred-l, supra note 309, at 24.
320. Id.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 2-9 (describing the content of these inquiries).
322. Memo from Marc Feldman, Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of
Law, to Donald Gifford, Dean, University of Maryland School of Law 2 (Jan. 31, 1997) (on
file with author).
323. Anthony M. DeSafano & Rose Kim, A System Beset By Problems, NEWSDAY, Oct. 9,
1995, at A7.
324. Memo from Marc Feldman to Donald Gifford, Jan. 31, 1997, supra note 322, at 2.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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lying philosophies are "radically different one from the other."327 For
half of the school day, Marc taught at Manhattan Village Academy, a
school begun largely under the leadership of its principal, Mary Butz.
Marc described Ms. Butz as "the iron-handed leader of the school.
Her 'picture' of a fine school resembles that of a good parochial
school." 328 Central Park East Secondary School, where Marc taught
the other half of the day, is "dramatically different. '3 29 While Manhat-
tan Village Academy graduated its first class during the year of Marc's
involvement there, Central Park East had been one of the very first
alternative public schools in New York.33 ° These "beacon schools"
were the result of an effort to create as many as fifty innovative schools
in the City. They are characterized by radical decentralization, high
levels of parent involvement, and teaching that connects learning to
331real world activities.
In a number of conversations I had with Marc during and after
his sabbatical, I urged him to write a comparative account of the two
schools in which he taught. Although Marc never wrote such an arti-
cle, I am pretty sure that he would have avoided declaring a "winner"
between the two and would have refused to take the position that one
approach is superior to the other. We will never know, precisely, what
Marc made of his teaching experiences in these two schools.3 2 What
I do know is that the particulars of the two methodologies pursued in
these schools, one relatively traditional, and the other an evolved form
of the progressive model of education, proved to be less important to
Marc than the features the two schools shared.
Consistent with John Dewey's theory of institutions, these features
all relate to the ability of the schools in question to maximize the ef-
fective power of each individual participant (students and teachers
alike), to insure his or her full development as a creative and produc-
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2 n.2.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See generally DAVID BENSMAN, QuALrrv EDUCATION IN THE INNER CIT THE STORY OF
THE CENTRAL PARK EAST SCHOOLS (1987) (tracing the application of "progressive educa-
tional theories" to the Central Park East Schools).
332. In the course of reviewing Marc's papers following his death, I found numerous
files containing the concrete data of those experiences. Included were his daily teaching
plans and notes, memoranda to students and co-teachers, narrative evaluations of his stu-
dents, and a variety of other documents accumulated in the normal course of teaching
high school classes of the sort Marc offered at Central Park East and Manhattan Village
Academy. While these materials would have been central to Marc's efforts to write about
his sabbatical experiences, there is no way that I or anyone else can possibly capture the
daily texture of his enterprise, or reconstruct it from the cold record he left behind. That
simply is not the point of this Article.
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tive member of the community, and to facilitate each participant's
voice in shaping and managing the collective enterprise. 33
The story of the Julia Richman Education Complex, within which
Marc also worked during his sabbatical, makes concrete and opera-
tional this vision of a public educational institution as effective public
space.334 Julia Richman represents a particular (and quite literal) ex-
ample of how to implement Joseph Featherstone's injunction that
"swollen and pathological" schools ought to be replaced with "some-
thing humane, voluntaristic and pluralistic. 335
The story involves the transformation of an all-too-typical large
central-city high school, riven by high drop-out rates, widespread vio-
lence, and vandalism, into a thriving education complex and resource
center for committed teachers. The transformation was begun in the
mid-1990s, when a group of school reformers in New York City, build-
ing upon the observation that small free-standing schools serve stu-
dents more effectively than do large traditional institutions, decided
to seek funding and school board approval for a plan to select, and
then close, a large failing public high school.3 3 6 The plan called for
the building to be transformed into a complex that would include a
number of smaller schools and other facilities, directed toward serving
the same population of students.33 7 With support from private foun-
dations and the teachers' union, the board agreed to the proposal.
Julia Richman High in Manhattan was selected as the site for this ex-
periment in renewal.338
An unpublished manuscript written by one of the leaders of this
project, found in Marc Feldman's files, describes Julia Richman prior
to its transformation:
Opened in 1913, as a commercial school for girls, Julia
Richman was a school with a long tradition.... [B]y 1928,
Julia Richman High School was regarded as one of the City's
333. See BENSMAN, supra note 331, at 8-9 (noting that the founders of the Central Park
East Schools drew on Dewey's educational philosophy).
334. Although Marc did not teach courses at Julia Richman, he spent considerable time
in the spring of his sabbatical year helping to design a library for the school and assisting in
the development of educational materials, including undertaking an arduous process of
selecting books that were to be purchased for the students' use.
335. Featherstone, Youth Deferred-I, supra note 309, at 24.
336. See Ann Cross, Unpublished Manuscript 3 (May 1977) (on file with author). This
project was undertaken by the Center for Collaborative Education, which is part of the
National Coalition of Essential Schools. It built upon the experience of the more than 125
small, free-standing schools that already operated under the umbrella of the New York
Networks For School Renewal. Id. at 2-3.
337. Id. at 3.
338. Id.
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premier academic high schools for girls. By the late 60s, like
many other New York City single-sex schools, it had became
co-educational [sic].
While the school had many illustrious years, it began,
following the massive budget cuts in the mid 1970's what can
now be seen as an almost inevitable slide downward: patterns
of chronic absenteeism and cutting developed. As the
school's performance decline [sic], its graduating classes
came to represent less than a third of those who had entered
as freshmen. Failure rates skyrocketed; violent attacks be-
came frequent. To insure safety, scanners were installed.
Yet, despite their presence, and the extra security personnel
who accompany the scanners, incidents within the school
and the surrounding neighborhood increased. Physically,
the building's once glamorous appearance rapidly declined.
Badly in need of maintenance for years, lack of funding pre-
vented even the most basic repair....
Despite repeated attempts to reassert the schools' educa-
tional mission, its reputation and performance continued to
decline; discipline became a top priority. At the end of the
large room housing the vice principal's office, a wire mesh
cage served to separate adversaries or hold unruly students
until the arrival of a police officer.339
The manuscript further recounts the efforts undertaken in the
early 1990s to save this "failing" school.340 First, the school system di-
rected that Julia Richman adopt a "curriculum concentration" strat-
egy, in which special programs and enriched curricula were
developed in order to "attract and hold on to the more determined
students."34' The strategy did not succeed in stemming the school's
decline, in part because it resulted in the creation of a cluster of
"haves" within the special programs who were resented by, and segre-
gated from, the "have nots" assigned to the regular curriculum. 34 2
Next, the school adopted a "house plan," in which the building was
divided into smaller units, in the hope of reducing the anonymity re-
sulting from its large size.34 Once again, the idea failed to stabilize
the school, probably because "the idea was introduced and adminis-
tered in the traditionally top down fashion: principals were told to cre-
339. Id. at 4-5.
340. Id. at 5-7.
341. Id. at 5.
342. Id. at 6.
343. Id.
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ate houses and they, in turn, told their faculties. As a result, little
planning and discussion occurred among those responsible for
spreading the idea." '344
On the heels of these failures, the proposal to close Julia Rich-
man and reopen it as a reconfigured educational campus largely has
been successful. After being selected for the project, Julia Richman's
then existing high school program was phased out over several years
as students graduated or left.345 In the interim, several new, much
smaller, schools were designed and opened in temporary space away
from the Julia Richman building."46 By 1997, the plan was almost fully
implemented, with the newly configured Julia Richman Complex
comprised of five distinct schools and several other programs. 47 In-
cluded were the Urban Academy, a small progressive school founded
in the late 1980s as a member of the Center for Collaborative Educa-
tion, the Manhattan International High School, the Vanguard High
School, Talent Unlimited, a professional arts program that had be-
come an autonomous school in 1994, and the Ella Baker Elementary
School.3 41 In addition, the campus contained an infant and toddler
center and daycare program, a vocational training program, an insti-
tute for high school seniors seeking to make the transition to college,
a professional development institute providing resources and training
programs for teachers, and a student health center operated in coop-
eration with Mt. Sinai Hospital.349
The success of this experiment is reflected in a number of objec-
tive measures. Attendance and graduation rates are up, and the Ur-
ban Academy, the anchor school within the complex, has maintained
a record of sending more than ninety percent of its graduates to col-
lege.35 ° The physical condition of the building has improved, there
has been a dramatic reduction in the number of violent incidents and
acts of vandalism, and "[t]hroughout the building, the focus has
shifted from concerns about security to an emphasis on education." 51
Several features of the design of the new complex stand out as
especially significant in contributing to these improvements. First is
the conscious decision of the planners to insure that students at the
various Julia Richman schools would not find themselves in age ghet-
344. Id. at 6-7.
345. Id. at 8.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 9.
348. Id. at 9-10.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 16-17.
351. Id. at 17.
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tos. 3 52 A critical element in the redesigned campus was the inclusion
of an infant/toddler and early childhood program together with an
elementary school. This decision has fostered the development of a
sense of community, in which "[c] hildren entering the infant toddler
center would be able to remain in the building throughout their en-
tire public school experience. Such children would be well known to
adults who could follow their progress and plan for continued
growth."353 In addition, the infant and toddler facility is made availa-
ble to parents who attend one of the other schools at Julia Richman,
thus making it possible for young parents to complete their high
school education while also insuring that their children are well cared
for.3 5 4 Finally, the age mix built into the campus provides older stu-
dents with opportunities to work with younger students while simulta-
neously providing younger children with older role models and
mentors.355 The power of this design element is well captured by the
following vignette:
A fire in an old electrical panel located in the school's
auditorium caused a smoke condition which resulted in the
evacuation of the building. As schools were leaving the
building in haste, the high school students who work in [the
elementary school's] after school program, grabbed their
coats and immediately reported to the elementary school
classrooms where they assisted in evacuating the youngest
children out of the building. No one said a word to them;
they simply knew to go where they were needed. The princi-
pal of [the elementary school] reported later that the pres-
ence of these students had an immediately calming effect on
the young children who assumed that now that all the famil-
iar adults were present, everything was [sic] would be all
right.356
A second critical step in the redesign of Julia Richman involved a
set of decisions that were made early on with respect to building secur-
ity. From its inception, the enterprise was founded upon the idea that
replacing one large bureaucratic institution with a number of smaller
more manageable schools would result in the creation of an "atmos-
phere in which students and staff c[ould] resolve potential conflicts
through dialogue and negotiation." 5 ' The notion here was that,
352. Id. at 10-11.
353. Id. at 10.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 11.
356. Id. at 17.
357. Id. at 11.
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within the reasonable boundaries of each individual school, a set of
genuine relationships based upon trust and respect could be en-
couraged and nurtured. To accomplish this goal, care was taken to
mark out each school's physical space within the larger complex, so
that students and teachers would be familiar with all those who moved
within their designated area.358
In addition, this approach to "creating safe spaces for each
school," framed a complex-wide discussion about the continued use of
weapons scanners at entrances to the building through which all Julia
Richman students had in the past been required to pass. 59 The issue
was taken up by a "Building Council," comprised of representatives
from each of the constituent schools. After discussion, there was
broad support for removing the scanners. Notwithstanding a clear
recognition that this decision "represented a calculated risk," stu-
dents, staff, and parents all agreed to the scanners' removal. 36" The
change was made, in part, in recognition that the former approach to
security had created a "siege mentality" within the school, giving the
"impression that the building was on the edge of losing control, that
its student body couldn't be trusted . ... "36 Equally important, be-
cause the removal of the scanners "represented the unanimous judg-
ment of those in the building,"36 2 the decision signaled a shift in the
ethos of the institution, in which the participants in this collective en-
terprise were now made responsible for fundamentally managing its
basic governance. Thus, not only was security in the new complex
linked explicitly to notions of trust and community, the institution it-
self, in the way it dealt with this sensitive issue, had adjusted expecta-
tions about the role that individuals should expect to play in its
ongoing administration.3
6 3
358. Id. While at first this approach might appear to be at odds with Professor Frug's
call for the development of urban environments in which individuals are encouraged to
interact with "strangers," at a deeper level, it is consistent with Frug's notion of "commu-
nity building" as a process that promotes the intermingling of people and groups across
the lines of class, race, sexual orientation, and the like. SeeFrug, supra note 13, at 1049. In
theory and in practice, each of the individual schools comprising the Julia Richman com-
plex seeks a high degree of "social differentiation" among those who make up its commu-
nity. In addition, the multiplicity of functions built into the public space defined by the
Julia Richman campus is precisely the sort of "variety" Frug seems to have in mind. See id.
at 1051 (describing "variety" as a normative value of city life, which "adds... a diversity of
activities within each city neighborhood and a differentiation between neighborhoods,
thereby producing a distinct sense of place when traveling from one location to another").
359. Cross, supra note 336, at 11.
360. Id. at 12.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See id.
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This example is entirely consistent with John Dewey's educational
theory, and with his notion that attending to the equitable distribu-
tion of effective power within those institutions in which people spend
their daily lives is a critical element of democratic reform. 64 The
planners of the Julia Richman experiment recognized this insight,
which was derived from the experience of others who had worked
with small, alternative public schools, and from a growing body of re-
search on the characteristics of successful schools. It was summed up
in their own words as follows: "[Q]uality education is best fostered
when schools are able to create communities in which participants
feel a sense of ownership. Establishing a sense of ownership depends
upon creating an entrepeneurial [sic], not hierarchical or bureau-
cratic, model in which participants have control over their working
environment."365
If not in all of the particulars, then at least in the animating spirit
of this enterprise, and in the efforts that Marc Feldman joined at the
Manhattan Village Academy and the Central Park East Secondary
School, the insights of John Dewey with respect to the role of public
institutions in a democratic society are well represented. While a vari-
ety of approaches to curriculum, evaluation, and staffing characterize
these different schools, they all share an essential commitment to pro-
viding students with a nonbureaucratic learning environment in
which each young person's capacity to develop and mature is taken
seriously. Marc did not have the chance to write about the details of
these experiences. In the concluding portion of this Article, however,
I seek to apply Marc's perspective on public education to several issues
that he was following, in order to suggest how he might have analyzed
them consistent with his experiences in New York.
C. Application to Ongoing Issues Within the Field of Education
As noted in the introduction to this Article, Marc Feldman was
intensely interested in the ongoing legal and political issues that dom-
inate discussion within the field of public education. Whether the
topic was community participation in matters of school governance,
school vouchers, single-sex schools, school finance litigation, or race
and class segregation in public education, Marc read and studied ev-
erything he could. Of course, his perspective was shaped by the no-
tion, described in the preceding discussion, that each of these
questions has to be resolved in a way that treats public educational
364. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
365. Cross, supra note 336, at 8.
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institutions as valuable public space.36 6 With that premise in mind, I
conclude this Article with a brief look at two of the controversies that
Marc was following during his sabbatical.
1. Community Participation in School Governance.-In addition to
his teaching at Manhattan Village Academy and Central Park East Sec-
ondary School and his consulting at the Julia Richman complex, a
final component of Marc's sabbatical experience was his work with an
independent school district in New York City. At the time, the New
York public schools were arranged in an elaborate bureaucratic organ-
ization. Elementary and middle schools fell within the jurisdiction of
thirty-two independent school districts, all governed by community
boards of education and headed by district superintendents. 367 Marc
concluded that among the most articulate, thoughtful, and innovative
of the district superintendents was the superintendent of District Two,
Anthony Alverado.36 Consequently, he arranged to work with him
and others in District Two. 36" During his involvement with them, a
highly publicized battle was waged by Schools Chancellor Rudolph
Crew and Mayor Rudolph Guiliani to withdraw substantial power from
all of the local school boards in New York City.37° Marc observed this
struggle first hand, and he believed that it symbolized the larger prob-
lem of diminishing community participation in public education else-
where in the country.
Once again the essays of Joseph Featherstone provide important
historical context for understanding this issue. In a series of articles
published in 1968 and 1969, Featherstone reported on a serious effort
by a broad coalition of politicians, community activists, and education
experts to create a system of community involvement in the public
school system in New York.37 ' To a significant extent, this work grew
out of frustration with the slow progress of desegregation that had
366. See supra notes 273-291 and accompanying text.
367. See generally Joseph Berger, Scandals at the School Boards Led to Loss of Their Powers,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1996, at Al (surveying efforts to centralize power in New York City
schools).
368. See Memo from Marc Feldman to Donald Gifford,Jan. 31, 1997, supra note 322, at I
(describing Alverado as a "visionary superintendent").
369. Id.
370. See, e.g., Melody Petersen, Schools Chief Vows to Press Battle on Troubled Districts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996, at B3.
371. Joseph Featherstone, The Albany Stranglers: Choking Off Community Schools, NEW RE-
PUBLIC, July 19, 1969, at 16 [hereinafter Featherstone, Albany Stranglers]; Joseph Feather-
stone, Community Control: Down But Not Out, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1969, at 11
[hereinafter Featherstone, Down But Not Out]; Joseph Featherstone, Community Control of
Our Schools, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 13, 1968, at 16 [hereinafter Featherstone, Community
Control].
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occurred in New York's schools. The first essay in Featherstone's se-
ries describes a report issued by an advisory committee chaired by Mc-
George Bundy, then at the Ford Foundation. 72 The Committee,
appointed by MayorJohn Lindsay, called for all of the City's schools to
be divided into a number of autonomous school districts. As envi-
sioned by the Bundy panel, each district would be run by a local
school board made up of six members elected by parents of school-
children and five members from the community appointed by the
mayor.173 The boards were to have the authority to hire and fire
teachers and administrators, including superintendents, to set curric-
ula, and to determine district budgets. 3 74 Featherstone states that the
proposals were supported by "an alliance of discontented ghetto lead-
ers and parents, some white civic groups, university and foundation
men, and Mayor Lindsay.... -17' They were opposed primarily by the
United Federation of Teachers and the City Board of Education, both
of whom stood to lose considerable power if the report's recommen-
dations were adopted. 6
In a follow-up article some months later, Featherstone reported
that the Bundy Committee's recommendations had been severely
watered down in a bill that had passed the New York State legisla-
ture. 377 "The first thing to understand," wrote Featherstone, "is the
magnitude of the rout of forces advocating community control.,
3 7 8
The legislature had essentially adopted a hybrid system, in which
more than thirty local school districts were created, but in which each
district's local school board would exercise "extremely limited pow-
ers." 79 Featherstone remarked that
the local boards are not boards at all; they are simply subdivi-
sions of the central educational agency. The loyalty of all em-
ployees is to the central agency; they are all, with the
exception of the district superintendent, appointed by the
Chancellor. Local boards can pick their superintendents.
Textbooks are chosen from a centrally approved list, exami-
nations are centrally prepared and evaluated, and the school
bureaucracy can change any program in a district at any
time. It can adjust local boundaries, remove personnel, and
372. Featherstone, Community Control, supra note 371, at 16.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 17.
376. Id.
377. Featherstone, Albany Stranglers, supra note 371, at 16.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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even eliminate the local school boards. The central board,
of course, will retain control of the city's high schools.3 8 °
In a final essay in this series, 381 Featherstone reviewed the events
of the preceding two years, and concluded that the local boards would
be "virtually powerless," and that the "bizarre procedures for electing"
boards were "designed to make it hard for parents, especially black
and Puerto Rican parents, to organize school reform slates." 82 While
Featherstone was correct that the enacted system was a far cry from
the sort of community involvement the Bundy panel had had in mind,
it turned out that his pessimistic assessment that local communities of
color would gain little or no voice in school policy was not completely
on the mark. In the years between 1969 and 1996, some local school
boards did pursue reform agendas and some did assume a not incon-
siderable influence over education policy.3 83 In addition, African
American and Latino communities obtained significant representa-
tion on some local boards.384 In general, however, the quality of pub-
lic school education in New York did not improve.
In 1996, not long after assuming his position, Chancellor Crew
suspended two local school boards in the Bronx and barred fourteen
school board members in Brooklyn from serving in their elected
posts.385 One of the Bronx suspensions was challenged in state court.
It emerged during that litigation that Chancellor Crew had based his
decision to take over the board of Community School District Seven
largely on allegations of corruption that had been aired on local tele-
vision.386 In addition to this ultimately unsuccessful litigation, the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice also reviewed the
suspensions, on claims that they violated the federal Voting Rights
380. Id.
381. Featherstone, Down But Not Out, supra note 371.
382. Id. at 11.
383. See, e.g., BENSMAN, supra note 331, at 7-10; see also MARY ANN RAYWID, CENTER FOR
EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION AT THE MANHATTAN INSTITUTE, THE CHOICE SYSTEM OF COMMU-
NITY SCHOOL DISTRCT 3: A REPORT (1996) (examining a middle school choice arrange-
ment in the district, under which youngsters and their families choose the school they will
attend).
384. See BENSMAN, supra note 331, at 7.
385. See Pam Belluck, Ousted School Officials Return, But Crew Digging in, Bars Them, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 1996, at Al, B5.
386. SeeJacques Steinberg, Crew's Big Test: Defending Board Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1996, at 37. In addition to allegations contained in the television accounts, Dr. Crew's
attorneys subsequently submitted a transcript of hearings held by a Bronx commission on
school corruption in which it was alleged that school board members had spent thousands
of dollars to attend conferences in Hawaii and the Virgin Islands. Dr. Crew also submitted
an affidavit in which he cited low reading scores at the district's elementary schools. Id.
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Act.387 The Justice Department concluded that the initial round of
suspensions did not violate the rights of voters in the predominately
African American and Latino districts.388 A subsequent board suspen-
sion in the South Bronx announced several months later by Dr. Crew,
however, was found to violate the federal voting law.389 Unlike the
earlier suspensions, which were based on allegations of corruption,
the suspension of this local school board in District Twelve, and the
replacement of elected board members with temporary trustees, grew
out of a disagreement between the local board members and the
Chancellor over the board's selection of a new superintendent.39 0
Stating that there was no evidence that the board made any procedu-
ral errors in its selection process, Assistant Attorney General Deval Pat-
rick announced that the replacement of the board members with
trustees amounted to an unlawful shift of authority from the elected
officials in the District to the central administration.9 1
In fact, Dr. Crew's actions with respect to District Twelve were
part of a larger effort on his part to gain greater control over the selec-
tion of superintendents, who in turn exercised substantial power over
local school policy. Virtually from the moment he took office, Dr.
Crew pursued legislation taking the authority to select superintend-
ents away from local boards and giving it to the Chancellor.3 92 Even
in the absence of such legislation, Crew announced that he expected
to use his power of suspension to exert greater control. He said: "I
want a right of refusal.... I need to be able to weigh in and have a
voice in the selection."393
In the days following the Justice Department's decision with re-
spect to District Twelve, a strange story unfolded. Notwithstanding
the Civil Rights Division's finding that the board's suspension consti-
tuted a voting rights violation, Dr. Crew refused to allow board mem-
bers to enter the school district offices.3 94 The excluded board
members conferred with their lawyers and held press conferences in
front of the building, while public school security officers insured that
they would not have access to their offices.395 This stand-off was
played out in the front pages of the local newspapers and on the
387. Belluck, supra note 385.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
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nightly news.3 9 6 It was not resolved until a month later, when the New
York State legislature essentially ended the conflict by enacting a thor-
ough overhaul of the system that had been in place since the 1960s.397
With the passage of this new legislation, the "rout of forces advo-
cating community control," about which Joseph Featherstone had
written many years earlier, was complete. 98 Instead of each local
elected school board picking its own superintendent and elementary
and junior high school principals, the new law provided for the Chan-
cellor to hire superintendents from lists forwarded by the school
board.399 If the Chancellor did not like the recommendations, the
law permitted him to send the matter back to the board for additional
names.400 The superintendents, in turn, would now select principals,
and the control of budgets would be shifted so that the Chancellor
would exercise much greater authority in allocating money.40 The
New York Times summed up the changes by reporting that "[t] he new
legislation gives school board members little more power than P.T.A.
presidents. '40 2 Once again, the matter was referred to the Justice De-
partment for a review of the new law's compliance with the Voting
Rights Act. Four months later, Attorney General Janet Reno an-
nounced that the Justice Department would not "interpose any objec-
tion," and the new provisions went into effect. 403
From a Deweyan perspective, the new provisions represent bad
public policy. The Bundy Committee's proposals that had begun New
York City's experiment in decentralized public school governance res-
onated with Dewey's notion that people whose lives are effected by
public institutions ought to have a significant voice in their manage-
ment.40 4 The plan as originally conceived treated schools as impor-
tant public assets within the local communities in which they were
located and recognized that members of those communities were im-
396. Id.
397. See N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 2590-a to 2950-s (McKinney 1996).
398. Featherstone, Albany Stranglers, supra note 371, at 16. One academic expert in pub-
lic school governance quoted in the New York Times remarked that the law represented "the
effective end of the New York City decentralization experiment." Berger, supra note 367
(quoting Robert Berne, Vice President For Academic Development, New York University).
399. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 2590-f.
400. Id.
401. Id. § 29 5 0-q.
402. Berger, supra note 367.
403. Jacques Steinberg, Power Shfi In the Schools Gets Approval, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1997, at
B1.
404. See supra notes 194-206 and accompanying text (describing Dewey's theory of dem-
ocratic institutions) and 372-376 and accompanying text (describing the Bundy Commit-
tee's proposal).
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portant stakeholders in those institutions.4 °" Advocates of local con-
trol necessarily worried over the capacity of individual schools to
transmit basic information and teach critical skills, the essential ele-
ments of a traditional vision of public education. But they emphasized
even more the potential of public schools to be places where "the
views and experiences of both the dominant group and minority
groups [could] meet, informing and transforming each other. '40 6 In
short, they recognized the public nature of public schools.
This original vision, of public schools as extensions of the larger
communities in which they were situated, while never fully imple-
mented in practice, did find expression in some of the reform efforts
that had been undertaken over the years. Many of the small-scale ex-
perimental schools that cropped up around New York had been nur-
tured and supported by local school boards.40 7 While the process had
been anything but uniform, some variation was inherent precisely be-
cause each board was local in nature. With the legislative overhaul
that went into effect in 1997, this experiment in local control had
ended.
Even before the adoption of the new law, however, Chancellor
Crew had begun to move away from an approach that sought innova-
tion within the context of local communities. As early as February of
1996, for example, Crew had proposed that a special new school dis-
trict be created under the direct control of the Chancellor.40 8 Impor-
tantly, this new "Chancellor's District" would contain not only failing
schools, but also alternative and experimental schools that had previ-
ously been administered within their local school districts.40 9 Thus, by
moving innovative schools into a centralized administrative structure,
by suspending a number of local school boards, and, ultimately, by
lobbying for and obtaining a legislative transfer of authority from local
school districts to the central schools administration, Chancellor Crew
and Mayor Giuliani had succeeded in implementing a new policy that
effectively diminished local community involvement in public educa-
tion. As Kathleen Stassen Berger, the board president of District Two,
summed up the situation: "[T]he people who know the community
best, and who are the parents of the children in the schools, are dis-
405. See supra notes 372-376 and accompanying text (describing the Bundy Committee's
proposal).
406. powell, supra note 10, at 785.
407. See, e.g., BENSMAN, supra note 331, at 7-10.
408. Sarah Kershaw, Board of Education Approves District for Troubled Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1996, at B6.
409. Id.
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tanced by the Chancellor's policies .... It is too distant from local
control."4 10
Supporters of the new law argued, by contrast, that even if com-
munity control was a good idea in principle, it had not been successful
in operation. They pointed out that since its adoption, the system of
local school board control had been dominated in many districts by
politicians seeking to use local board positions as a stepping stone to
higher offices such as the City Council or the State legislature, and not
by parents or their representatives.411 In addition, they asserted, the
new law recognized the legitimate interests of parents by requiring
each school principal to consult periodically with a management team
comprised of parents, teachers, and other school staff members.41 2
The statutory requirement of periodic consultation 413 does not
honor John Dewey's fundamental principle that democratic practice
requires effective power to be equitably distributed. The plain fact is
that these management teams were not given any real appointive or
policy-making power under the statute and were relegated to making
nonbinding recommendations.414 More importantly, the legislature's
decision to drain power from the local school boards short-circuited a
more promising approach to improving the system. In the election
cycle immediately preceding the statutory overhaul, a concerted effort
had been made to recruit and support parents and other reform can-
didates for school board positions.41 5 Dozens of community organiza-
tions, church groups, and parents associations had worked to find and
train a new cadre of leadership for the community school board sys-
tem.416 In addition, local organizations had undertaken voter regis-
tration drives and sponsored candidate forums. In District Nine, one
of the first to be taken over by Chancellor Crew, these activities led to
the registration of some 4000 new voters.417 These efforts were un-
likely to yield conclusive results in a single election. However, instead
of rendering them essentially moot, as the new law did, a better ap-
proach to public education reform would have been to support the
opening up of the local school boards through local political activity.
410. Steinberg, supra note 403 (quoting Kathleen Stassen Berger, President of Local
School Board, District Two and President of School Boards for Equity, Accountability and
Community).
411. Maria Newman, Joining A School Board To Change It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at B3.
412. Dao, supra note 12.
413. N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 2590-h(15) (McKinney 1996).
414. See id.; see also Berger, supra note 367.
415. Newman, supra note 411.
416. See id.
417. See id.
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Some years ago, Joseph Featherstone observed:
One reason schools are traditionally a focus of attack is that
historic outsiders in our culture-minorities and the poor-
know that it is sometimes easier to get concessions in educa-
tion than elsewhere. Getting a form of community control
in Bedford-Stuyvesant-however compromised and inade-
quate as a solution to the problems of educating poor chil-
dren-is easier than getting your hands on the Chase
Manhattan Bank. Just as politics, for all its corruption by dis-
parate economic power, offers underdogs an occasional
lever to pull, so education, for all its rigidities, offers them
some purchase on the rest of the social order.
418
Progressives need not limit their vision of political reform to
large-scale social movements based solely upon class, race, and other
essentialist categories. Neither should they retreat into believing that
disconnected individual acts of resistance are the only possible alter-
natives. Grassroots political campaigns directed toward opening up
public institutions, like the efforts of reformers in New York City prior
to the enactment of the new education law in 1996, provide a better
model. It is sobering to observe how fragile this kind of political prac-
tice is, given the premature conclusion effected by the New York State
legislature in this instance. But one could regard this set of events as a
source of new insight and inspiration, and not as confirmation that
such political activism should be abandoned. In New York City and
Baltimore, Maryland and elsewhere, public education is likely to con-
tinue to serve as a battleground in the long-term struggle to define the
nature of our communities. From this perspective, Marc Feldman's
vision of public schools as institutional spaces in which democratic
society enacts its best, and sometimes its worst, impulses, is a powerful
vision.
2. Vouchers.-Although market alternatives to the public school
system have been debated for a long time,419 school voucher pro-
grams have gained considerable popularity in recent years.4 2° The
various proposals that have been put forward vary to some degree, but
they all tend to call for a portion of a jurisdiction's public education
418. Featherstone, Youth Deferred-II, supra note 309, at 25.
419. Liebman, supra note 11, at 277-78.
420. See Sherry, supra note 151, at 200; see also Abby Goodnough, Mayor and School Board
Study Milwaukee Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at B3 (describing Mayor Giuliani's at-
tempt to start voucher programs in New York City).
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budget to be allocated to paying private and parochial school
expenses.42
Proponents have argued that private schools are more effective
than public schools at providing a sound education, and that institut-
ing government supported choice will bring to poor and middle class
parents the kind of educational options that have long been available
to wealthy families.422 Opponents have argued that "such a system
would increase racial and economic segregation, and that it would
benefit only the wealthy, leaving the poorest students in public
schools that deteriorate even further as those with greater choice
abandon them."4 23 Whatever the merits of these competing argu-
ments, it seems apparent that removing resources from public schools
and placing them in private institutions is inconsistent with a perspec-
tive in which the health of public spaces is held out as a prerequisite
for the proper functioning of democratic society.42 4
Given this observation, perhaps the most interesting argument in
favor of vouchers has been put forward by Professor Suzanna Sherry
in her 1995 article, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizen-
ship.425 Sherry's analysis builds upon an overarching commitment to
hold children and their families accountable for their individual
shortcomings or successes in school.4 26 She distills this principle of
individual responsibility from the particular brand of civic republican-
ism that she has described in a number of her published articles.4 27
Sherry summarizes her position on vouchers in the following terms:
421. Sherry, supra note 151, at 200.
422. See id. at 201, 205.
423. Id. at 202 (footnote omitted).
424. To be sure, it is not too difficult to call into question the very distinction between
public and private activities upon which this conclusion rests. Without going too far down
that road, it should suffice to point out that, unless the size of vouchers is sufficiently large
to allow families, including poor families, to select from among a full range of school
options, the consequence of placing government generated dollars into a private educa-
tion market is likely to be a diminution of the degree to which people from different walks
of life are educated together. See Liebman, supra note 11, at 284-86.
425. Sherry, supra note 151. An examination of Professor Sherry's discussion of vouch-
ers is especially appropriate in the context of this Article because she employs what she
regards as a pragmatist approach throughout her analysis. Id. at 164-65. The following
should not be taken as an attempt at a full consideration of the question of vouchers and
school choice. It is, instead, framed in response to Sherry's approach, in order to demon-
strate what a Deweyan position on this question might look like.
426. Id. at 184.
427. Id. at 133 n.5; see also Suzanna Sherry, "Without Virtue There Can Be No Liberty," 78
MINN. L. REV. 61, 68-75 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Republican Citizenship In A Democratic Soci-
ety, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1229, 1242-46 (1988) (reviewing Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EnUCA-
TION (1987)).
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The uniquely republican advantage to a choice system
* . . is that it rewards and encourages individual responsibil-
ity. Families who are forced into unresponsive public schools
by economic circumstances, and commentators who bemoan
those schools' dismal statistics, will inevitably tend to blame
the schools when students do not do well. Indeed, the stu-
dents' failure may be due in part to poor schools which have
little or no incentive to improve and in part to the lack of
choice itself. Removing the compulsion removes the crutch
that allows individuals and families to claim this type of vic-
tim status. A well-designed choice plan tells families that
they are responsible for their children's education, and that
even the very poor will be rewarded-with superior school-
ing and the subsequent economic and social advantages it
confers-if they act responsibly.4 28
In assessing this argument, it is important to understand Sherry's
conception of public education, which she says is to "prepare children
to become responsible and deliberative citizens in a diverse republic of
rights."429 She argues that successful republican democracy requires
citizens who have received an education that teaches "cultural liter-
acy," "critical thinking," and "moral character. "430 With respect to
cultural literacy, Sherry asserts that Americans need to share a com-
mon culture in order to exercise republican citizenship in an ethni-
cally and religiously diverse society. The alternative, she claims, is "an
America that consists of separate and individual cultures with no com-
mon bond, [in which] citizens will have no reason to act on behalf of
either the common good or members of other groups."431
428. Sherry, supra note 151, at 201-02.
429. Id. at 157.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 165. Sherry acknowledges that traditional liberal theory presses toward value
neutrality in public education, but she concludes that the inculcation of values is inevitable
in any educational practice, so that the real question is not whether, but which values will
be taught. Id. at 158-59; see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented
Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. REv. 329, 383-384
(1994). Sherry's proposal is that public educators seek an inclusive "multi-ethnic" set of
cultural values. Sherry, supra note 151, at 166. Ironically, she adopts what she claims to be
a pragmatic approach to formulating this common set of values. In her version of pragma-
tism, tradition plays a leading role in marking out the foundations of the common culture
to be transmitted in public education. Id. at 165. Further elaborating upon this notion of
cultural literacy, Sherry endorses what she terms a "pluralist multiculturalism," in which a
broad array of cultures are included in a common pedagogical canon, rather than a "par-
ticularistic multiculturalism," in which the very possibility (or desirability) of a common
culture is rejected. Id. at 167. Sherry's preference for an inclusive variety of multicultural-
ism is grounded upon her conclusion that the particularistic approach is part of a larger,
postmodern philosophical stance. That stance, in turn, is unacceptable to Sherry because
20021
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The potential problem here is that a system of school vouchers
could be seen as likely to undermine the very transmission of a com-
mon culture that Sherry holds out as so central to republican democ-
racy.4 32 She quotes one education policy expert who predicts that
vouchers would encourage "separation and stratification of students
according to parental commitments and orientations, 43 3 but Sherry
rejects this conclusion for two reasons. First, she points out that
wealthy families already send their children disproportionately to pri-
vate schools. Thus, she argues, "[t]he 'cultural transmission' critics
must either concede that private schools are also transmitting a com-
mon culture... or be willing to abandon the children of the wealthy
to educational failure."4 34 Second, Sherry argues that a system of pub-
licly supported private schools "need not entail abandonment of state
involvement in the curriculum."
4 35
Both of Professor Sherry's responses on this point are problem-
atic. With respect to the first, it may be that private schools for the
wealthy do not uniformly teach "cultural literacy," if by this phrase we
have in mind a common culture that includes minority group tradi-
tions often excluded in elite institutions. At the same time, a position
in opposition to vouchers does not necessarily mean that the children
of the wealthy must be doomed "to educational failure."4 36 Instead, if
such a position were linked to a serious policy of improving public
schools, of reinvigorating those public spaces, then it might be possi-
its antiessentialism and antifoundationalism create a moral and epistemological relativism
which she regards as inconsistent with republican thought. Id. Importantly, this thinking
leads Sherry to criticize the use of an Afrocentric curriculum for African-American stu-
dents as well as other ethnocentric curricula for other students, on the theory that such a
particularistic approach to multiculturalism is likely to "degenerat[e] into a war of all
against all." Id. at 168. Sherry is especially critical of moral (and cultural) relativism, given
her conviction that "certain ways of behaving or believing are irresponsible and unvirtuous
and ought to be discouraged or prohibited." Id at 159.
432. Significantly, in elaborating upon her notion of cultural literacy, Sherry suggests
that the success of African-American children depends upon their proximity to a white,
middle-class cultural standard. Sherry, supra note 151, at 169. Instead of conceptualizing
public education as a process by which children from different backgrounds and different
circumstances are brought together to participate in the ethically rich work of encounter-
ing one another's experiences and perspectives, her conclusion is that "[dlepriving black
children of the norms and knowledge of the culture in which they will live thus condemns
them to a life of marginality and segregation." Id. On the importance of distinguishing
between "assimilation" and "integration," see powell, supra note 10, at 774-78.
433. Sherry, supra note 151, at 205-06 (quoting HENRY M. LEVIN, INSTITUTE FOR RE-
SEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE, EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 16 (1979)).
434. Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
435. Id.
436. Id.
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ble to attract some number of private school students into the public
school system.
437
Sherry's second point, that a voucher system is not inconsistent
with the public regulation of private school curricula, fails to take seri-
ously Dewey's notion of a strong connection between the content of a
community's norms and the institutional contexts in which those
norms are created and implemented. According to Dewey, the sub-
stantive ethical content that characterizes a community's life together
must be understood as inseparable from the interactions that take
place within the public institutions, including educational institutions,
that make up that community. 43 8 By contrast, Sherry seems to be sug-
gesting that the broad outlines of a common culture can be generated
through formal political deliberations and then transferred largely un-
disturbed to educational settings, public or private, for subsequent
transmission to students.439
Sherry describes her proposal as falling midway between "mini-
mal and pervasive regulation," in that it envisions a strong governmen-
tal role in determining "what, generally, must be taught," while
reserving considerable discretion in private schools to decide "how it
is to be taught and how the schools are to be run. 440 She argues that,
because it is "unlikely that all parents will ever agree on educational
strategy," the best solution is to permit individual choice rather than
requiring parents to "settle their differences."441
Sherry's vision fails to embrace fully the deep connection be-
tween the what and the how of educational practice. Her plan facili-
tates the privatization of educational practice all the while
maintaining that public discourse can still shape the requirements of
437. Cf powell, supra note 10, at 791-93 (arguing that racial integration in schools is not
enough, rather all important institutions need to be integrated to "strengthen
communities").
438. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75, 131-132.
439. Implied in Sherry's approach is a distinction, not unlike that drawn by Hannah
Arendt, between the practice of political discourse on the one hand, and the "administra-
tion of things" on the other. See ARENDT, supra note 153, at 278. As noted earlier, Arendt's
position was that public deliberations should be insulated from the distorting influence of
the world of "everyday necessity." See supra text accompanying note 152. John Dewey's
approach, by contrast, was to treat the social aspects of everyday life as an inherent element
of a community's politics. See WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 246-47. From a Deweyan per-
spective, then, Sherry's proposal to treat decisions about how schools are run and how
content is taught as matters of mundane administration separate and distinct from the
public question of what should be taught fails to appreciate that daily interactions among
parents, students, teachers, and school administrators over the implementation of an edu-
cational program is itself public discourse of great potential normative significance.
440. Sherry, supra note 151, at 207.
441. Id.
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a basic education for all. But a policy of avoiding disagreements over
questions of implementation,44 2 by permitting exit from-indeed,
providing public financial support for the exit from-public educa-
tional institutions, would be likely to influence profoundly the ongo-
ing public deliberations over content.
Moreover, even if parents in a polyglot culture are unlikely to
"settle their differences" over questions of educational approach once
and for all, removing the discourse over those disagreements from the
very institutional context in which it most matters can only have the
effect of insuring that the resulting public debate over education will
remain impoverished and unresponsive to the needs of all children.
Such an approach undermines the very process of community build-
ing that Marc Feldman, Jerry Frug and others have called for. Like
land use and zoning policies that encourage housing patterns segre-
gated by class and race, a school voucher policy that indulges the de-
sire of parents holding conflicting perspectives "to avoid dealing with
each other" perpetuates the fantasy that people can build "purified
communit[ies] ."" As Professor Frug points out, however, this fantasy
has a number of negative consequences:
What's wrong with these purified forms of identity? [Rich-
ard] Sennett's response is that they create "a state of absolute
bondage to the status quo" and, as a result, limit people's
lives. A reliance on stability, coherence, and order inhibits
openness to experience: It undermines one's ability even to
absorb, let alone enjoy, the flux and variety the world has to
offer.
444
The second and third components of a republican education
cited by Sherry are critical thinking and moral character.445 With re-
spect to these components, Sherry urges that responsible citizenship
requires a predisposition "to act responsibly and in accord with com-
"1446munity norms, except in those cases where a departure from those
norms is supported by a "deliberative, reasoned" decision-making pro-
cess. 44 7 This notion, that public education for moral character should
be directed toward encouraging compliance with community norms,
is meant to draw upon and reinforce Sherry's call for cultural literacy.
442. Id.
443. Frug, supra note 13, at 1052.
444. Id. at 1053 (footnote omitted) (quoting RicHRmD SENNETr, THE USES OF DISORDER:
PERSONAL IDENTITY & CITY LIWE 134 (1970)).
445. Sherry, supra note 151, at 157.
446. Id. at 177.
447. Id. at 174.
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Perhaps sensing that the combination of these proposals could be
read to suggest the imposition of majority norms upon individuals
with minority group affiliations, she proceeds to explain that she is
"talking about only the most basic sorts of cultural norms, which are
... relatively uncontested (although not always emphasized): individ-
ual responsibility, honesty, hard work, tolerance, and so on. 4 4 8
Sherry argues that a rejection of any of these core norms on the
grounds that they are "Eurocentric" or are inhospitable to one or an-
other subculture within the United States is to "retreat into a relativ-
ism that approaches nihilism. '44 9  This conclusion is plainly
inconsistent with the view that even norms such as individual responsi-
bility and tolerance are socially contingent, and, necessarily, there-
fore, always in contest. As discussed earlier, some postmodern legal
scholars have challenged the Enlightenment conception of the self as
autonomous and stable, which, in turn, they see as a predicate for the
sort of individual responsibility posited by liberal theory.4 50 Their ar-
448. Id. at 177.
449. Id. at 171.
450. See powell, supra note 40, at 1496-97. A similar critique is available with respect to
Sherry's unproblematic treatment of tolerance as a core community value. A good exam-
ple can be found in the academic literature on free speech, one area in which the notion
of tolerance has played a leading role in liberal legal thought. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER,
THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 57 (1986); Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 979 (1990). The work ofjohn powell once again is instructive in under-
standing the progressive alternative to the mainstream liberal approach. In a recent article
on hate speech, powell explains that the traditional narrative of the First Amendment, in
which "more speech serves as a panacea for any injury stemming from harmful expres-
sion," fails to capture the important ways in which racial epithets and other similar expres-
sions of hate materially impact the social and political participation of minority members
of society. powell, supra note 185, at 103. The starting point for powell's analysis is the
classic liberal image informing free speech jurisprudence, Justice Holmes's famous "mar-
ketplace of ideas" formulation in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). powell argues that this image is fundamentally flawed
because it fails to take into account the ways in which that market is impaired by "dispari-
ties of power based on race, class, and gender." powell, supra note 185, at 106. With re-
spect to disparities of power, powell points out that traditional free speech jurisprudence
"analyzes each individual act of expression independently, with little regard for how that
expression fits into the complex web of social discourse." Id. at 109. As a consequence, he
asserts, the marketplace of ideas paradigm fails to insure meaningful participation for all,
and fails to acknowledge the impact that hate speech has upon the construction of identity
among targeted minorities. Id. Employing the work of Stanley Fish, powell explains that
speech acts not only have positive communicative attributes-they not only express the
views and perspectives of the speaker-they also are capable of restricting the expressive
capacity of others. Id, at 98. This is true, he explains, because all assertions necessarily
negate alternative possible articulations. Thus, when the social power of one group of
speakers is markedly superior to that of another, the negating quality of the former
group's speech may overcome the competing expressions of the latter group. Id. at 98.
This interplay between speech and power is especially important when the articulations are
about race. In powell's analysis, race is a social construct, and it is language in particular
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gument that individual identities are formed through a process of so-
cial interaction and are "inscribed in a multiplicity of social
relations, '  unsettles the conventional notions of individual agency
by which the ascription of individual responsibility ordinarily is ac-
complished.452 To be sure, the premise that individuals necessarily
occupy "many subject positions"45 need not necessarily lead to a radi-
cally determinist view of human choice, but it does suggest that
agency "might be situated in the individual, in the intersubjective
community, and in the structure of our society."454 The practice of
locating moral agency exclusively in individual actors, by contrast, may
have the effect of marginalizing those cultural traditions in which in-
dividualism is muted, thereby disempowering particular groups in so-
ciety.4"5 Asjohn powell has explained: "By construing the essence of
the human self as individual and autonomous, European thinkers de-
liberately excluded from selfhood members of non-White societies
that were organized around non-individualistic norms. "456
Given this critique of individual responsibility, John Dewey's no-
tion of sympathetic character45 7 may serve as a better foundation
upon which to analyze questions of public policy, including the ques-
tion of school choice. Instead of treating each family as "responsible
for their children's education" alone,458 this approach would en-
courage each family to act to further the "well-being of all con-
cerned."459 It would recognize that the interests of one's own
that "materializes racial constructions." Id. In these terms, racial epithets work a direct
harm on their subjects because they contribute to a larger web of discourse that situates
people of color on the margins of society. Id. A First Amendment jurisprudence centered
on tolerating racial epithets in the name of protecting the liberty and autonomy of the
speaker, and by extension the liberty and autonomy of everyone in society, then, has con-
crete costs when examined from the perspective of those whose autonomy and access to
the democratic process is undermined by the very same expressive acts.
451. Robert S. Chang, Essay, The End of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of the Essentialist
Subject, 45 Am. U. L. REV. 687, 690 (1996) (quoting Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and New
Political Subjects: Towards a New Concept of Democracy, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURE 89-90 (Gary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)).
452. See generally Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245 (1992) (arguing that the legal system creates and maintains the
idea that human activity is the product of individual free will).
453. Chang, supra note 451, at 691 (quoting Mouffe, supra note 451, at 89-90).
454. powell, supra note 40, at 1514.
455. See generally DAVID T. GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF
MEANING 1540 (1993) (discussing how Western cultures have assigned racial categories
moral meanings).
456. powell, supra note 40, at 1490.
457. See supra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
458. Sherry, supra note 151, at 202.
459. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 413.
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children and the interests of others are reciprocal, and that the educa-
tional experience of each child is tied up with the experience of other
young people in the community.
This reciprocity was inherent in Dewey's conception of educa-
tion. "Dewey always stressed the broad social function of education,
and considered the 'formation of social disposition' much more im-
portant than the 'acquisition of literacy."' 460 Dewey recognized that
the interactions students have with others whom they encounter in
school constitute a central component of the educative process. 461 He
further recognized that effective educational practice in a democracy
depends upon "lIt] he intermingling in the school of youth of different
races, differing religions, and unlike customs, ' 462 in order to over-
come the tendency to treat " [w] hat is strange or foreign" as "morally
forbidden and intellectually suspect. "463 Once again, understanding
public education as public space presses into focus the fundamental
idea that learning to live with others who are different, and learning
from our encounters with those who hold different beliefs, perspec-
tives, and backgrounds is an essential part of forming our own identi-
ties. It recognizes that "[w]e are not hopelessly constrained by our
perspectives-rather through engagement and vulnerability we can be
influenced in a way that incrementally transforms our character. "464
Professor Sherry surely is correct in criticizing "unresponsive pub-
lic schools" into which too many children are shunted by virtue of
"economic circumstances."465 The question, however, is whether pub-
lic resources should be directed toward arming those children's fami-
lies to seek a narrowly self-interested solution to this problem. Marc
Feldman thought not. He warned against a growing tendency toward
the "privatization of social life,"466 and the "dissolution of social ties
and relationships."467 In their place, he urged a practice of building
public spaces, including public schools, that would be responsive to
the needs of all, including those on the margins of society. He was
unwilling to give up on the progressive project marked out by John
Dewey, and on the basic pragmatist insight that "social life ha[s] in-
460. Martin, supra note 54, at 61 (quoting DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 69, at
9).
461. See DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 69, at 16-17.
462. 1& at 21.
463. Id. at 17.
464. powell, supra note 185, at 118.
465. Sherry, supra note 151, at 201.
466. Feldman, supra note 16, at 1599.
467. Id. at 1600 n.203.
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trinsic moral significance."46 Far from treating this as merely an ab-
stract aspiration, however, he sought out those whose work
demonstrates that there may be hope yet for a truly radical reconstruc-
tion of public schools as an essential component of democratic
society.
CONCLUSION
In an especially moving passage in one of his recent articles,john
powell has described John Dewey's notion of sympathetic character as
a kind of empathy that is an "experientially defined emotional re-
sponse to the situation of another, the capacity to dance lightly in
another's reality."469 Elsewhere, in terms that evoke the work of Marc
Feldman, powell has suggested that empathic practice involves a will-
ingness to "let our guard down, and to adopt vulnerability and open-
ness" toward strangers. 470 The essential openness he has in mind
requires that one's encounters with others be undertaken with a genu-
ine intention to revise one's perspective, indeed one's sense of self, in
light of the experience of the encounter.4 71
Such a conception of empathic participation is at the core of
Dewey's pragmatist theory of democracy. Dewey believed that
"[s] ociety not only continues to exist by transmission, by communica-
tion, but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communica-
tion. '"472 As applied to public education, this pragmatist theory
suggests that the formal content of any public school setting, its cur-
riculum and the like, is far less important than the ways in which par-
ticipants engage one another. For Dewey, communication was not
only the substance of democracy, but also the substance of educa-
tional practice. In his terms, genuine communication demands that
participants draw upon experience. To speak from experience, how-
ever, "requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it,
considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so
468. WESTBROOK, supra note 26, at 415.
469. powell, supra note 185, at 111.
470. Id. at 116.
471. powell explains:
This suggestion to let our guard down, and to adopt vulnerability and openness as
an orientation toward experimentation, is voiced by Roberto Unger. Unger as-
serts that because the "gesture of self-exposure lacks a predetermined out-
come-a situation in stark contrast to the range of possibilities yielded by the
shared claims of pre-existing communities-it emphasizes the power inherent in
the individual to treat character as open and revisable.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting ROBERTO M. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 98
(1984)).
472. DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 69, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
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that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its mean-
ing. '473 In this sense, the pragmatist educational philosophy of John
Dewey was more than merely instrumental. It turned upon the ethical
significance of experience, the fact that learning requires both an act
and a conscious appreciation of the consequences of that act for one's
self and for others. In Dewey's account, "[w]hen an activity is contin-
ued into the undergoing of consequences, when the change made by
action is reflected back into a change made in us, the mere flux is
loaded with significance. We learn something."4 74
Marc Feldman's work embodied this understanding of the cen-
tral role that empathetic participation plays in effective educational
practice and in effective democratic practice. During his sabbatical,
he surely "learn [ed] something" in a way that few of us do in our
formal research. He took seriously his own previously stated impera-
tive not to shrink from engagement with others whose lives would oth-
erwise have been far removed from his own. In so doing, I am sure he
had a great impact on those he encountered in the public spaces he
occupied. I am also sure that he was profoundly changed by many of
those same encounters.
473. Id. at 5-6.
474. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted).
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